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Abstract
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) government has made countless efforts to fight
radicalization propaganda in cyberspace. However, cyber technology evolution and
the smart use of social media in fostering terrorist activities and radical ideologies have
posed big challenges. Numerous studies have tried to understand online radicalization
communication strategies, but very few have investigated the effectiveness of counterradicalization programs in the UAE and the world in general. This research aims first
to understand the network, communication, and narrative characteristics of
radicalization and counter-radicalization accounts on Twitter. It also aims to explore
factors that influence engagements for both types of accounts. Lastly, identifying the
differences between radicalization and counter-radicalization accounts helps
understand and evaluate the counter-radicalization efforts and programs. The research
questions and hypotheses were based on the social identity model of deindividuation
effect (SIDE) and the heuristic-systematic model of information processing (HSM).
Twitter account context and content data were analyzed to test the hypotheses using
the computational method. Social network analysis, content analysis, and statistical
analyses, including multiple regression and non-parametric tests, were conducted to
understand and compare the radicalization/counter-radicalization communication
structures and characteristics. The results showed that radicalization network
communities were separated based on Islam's two main denominations (Sunni and
Shia Islam), and counter-radicalization network communities were separated based on
narrative strategies (counter and alternative narratives). The research also identifies
several content and context factors influencing engagement. In radicalization accounts,
factors such as messenger type, sentiment, narrative, and hashtag use were found to
have a positive influence on engagement. However, in counter-radicalization accounts,
sentiment and narrative type are the only factors that influence engagement.
Radicalization and counter-radicalization results were compared. It was concluded that
religious scholars and social narratives play an important role in Twitter engagements,
suggesting that incorporating religious scholars and social narratives in counterradicalization programs will increase engagement and help online counterradicalization.

viii
Keywords: Radicalization, Counter-Radicalization, Twitter Analysis, Computational
Methods.
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)Title and Abstract (in Arabic

فهم اإلتصال في التطرف ومحاربة التطرف في التواصل اإلجتماعي :تحليل تويتر
الملخص

مع ثورة التكنولوجيا الرقمية والهواتف المحمولة والشبكة العنكبوتية ،األيدلوجيا المتطرفه تخترق
اآلن وتنتشر من خالل اشكال جديدة من االتصال الجماهيري بشكل عام وفي منصات شبكات
التواصل اإلجتماعي بالتحديد .هذا اإلنتشار يعد حاليا من اهم المهددات في جهود الحكومات
لمحاربة لإلرهاب والتطرف .حكومة اإلمارات العربية المتحدة تسعي باستمرار بمحاربة هذه
االفكار المتطرفه في الفضاء السيبيري ،ولكن التطورات التي تشهدها منصات التواصل
اإلجتماعي جعلتها بيئه خصبه ألصحاب الفكر المتطرف لنشر افكارهم وتحريض الجمهور لتبني
هذه األفكار مما يجعلها متفوقه على الجهود الحكوميه للتصدي ومحاربتها ،يهدف هذا البحث أوالً
إلى فهم الخصائص الشبكية والتواصلية والسردية لحسابات التطرف ومكافحة التطرف في تويتر.
ضا إلى استكشاف العوامل التي تؤثر على التفاعالت لكل من حسابات التطرف وحسابات
ويهدف أي ً
مكافحة التطرف وعمل دراسه مقارنه بين حسابات التطرف وحسابات مكافحة التطرف للمساهمه
في تقييم اداء مراكز وبرامج مكافحة التطرف اإللكتروني .تم بناء أسئلة البحث وفرضيات البحث
بنا ًء على نظريتين وهما نموذج الهوية االجتماعية لتأثير عدم التمييز ( )SIDEالمختصه في
الهوية اإلجتماعية و نظرية ( )HSMالتي تسلط الضوء طريقه تلقي ومعالجة المعلومات .من
خالل تحليل الشبكة االجتماعية وتحليل المحتوى والتحليل اإلحصائي ،أظهرت النتائج أن
مجتمعات شبكة التطرف تم فصلها على أساس المذهبين الرئيسيين لإلسالم (اإلسالم السني
والشيعي) .وتم انقسام مجتمعات شبكة مكافحة التطرف على أساس استراتيجيات السرد (الرواية
المضادة والسردية البديلة) .واسفرت نتائج البحث الى تحديد العديد من عوامل المحتوى والسياق
التي تؤثر على التفاعل .حيث انه يعد نوع المرسل والمشاعر والسرد واستخدام الهاشتاج من
العوامل التي تؤثر على التفاعل في حسابات التطرف .اما في حسابات مكافحة التطرف  ،فإن
المشاعر ونوع السرد لهما تاثير على التفاعل .وفي الختام تمت مقارنة نتائج التطرف ونتائج
دورا مه ًما في التفاعل على
مكافحة التطرف وتبين ان علماء الدين والسرد االجتماعي يلعبان ً
شبكة تويتر مما يشير إلى أن دمج علماء الدين والخطاب االجتماعي في برامج مكافحة التطرف
سيزيد من المشاركات ويساعد في مكافحة التطرف عبر اإلنترنت.
مفاهيم البحث الرئيسية :التطرف ،محاربة التطرف ،تحليل تويتر ،الطرق الحسابية.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Overview
Terrorists, extremists, and radical individuals have successfully used social
media networks to plant radical and extremist ideologies, foster terror and panic, create
widespread chaos, and destabilize states and influence public opinion. Over the past
few years, terrorist organizations’ and radical groups’ propaganda tactics and
communication strategies on social media have seized the attention of analysts,
researchers, and journalists. They are startled by these groups’ ability to recruit
thousands of people from all parts of the world. Consequently, the dissemination of
radical ideologies online has become a serious global challenge, especially with the
rise of terrorism.
Post-9/11, efforts have been made, primarily in the Arab world, to prevent
radical ideologies from spreading to youth and the public generally. These efforts
include reforming Islamic studies and school textbooks in Muslim and Arab countries
like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These efforts also extended to monitoring Friday
prayer speeches by religious clerics and scholars to exclude all forms of radicalization
that may fuel hatred and intolerance. Muslim countries have applied other measures to
prevent the adoption of radical beliefs. Efforts such as monitoring mosques’ speeches,
reforming Islamic textbooks, and modifying media content, aimed to eliminate the
dissemination of any radical activities within the state. Whether or not these measures
were successful, they did restrict terrorists from injecting their radical beliefs and
circulating their ideologies in the traditional way (i.e., offline).
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However, these solutions have been challenged with the rise of digital and
social media, where terrorists can access, disseminate, and propagate all types of
messages to a large scale of users around the globe. These new media platforms
become an alternative communication tool for a radicalized organization to overcome
all the censorship they may encounter in traditional media. Terrorist, extremist, and
radicalized organizations or individuals, therefore, have found a fertile land through
which they can achieve many of their goals in an open and safer communication form,
without direct clashes with any state institutions.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Since the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), countless
studies have been done to counter their online propaganda in the West and stop the
recruiting of foreign fighters. ISIL’s exploitation of social media and digital strategy
plays a critical role in its global dissemination of propaganda, radicalization, and
recruitment. However, systematic research on Islamic terrorist communication via
social media is limited (Chatfield, Reddick, & Brajawidagda, 2015). ISIL’s online
propaganda was not only effective in recruiting foreign fighters from non-Muslim
countries, but it also successfully attracted more than ten thousand Arab citizen
fighters (Benmelech & Klor, 2016). Few studies have been done to understand the
communication strategy and propaganda tactics used by radicals and extremists online
and through other platforms, especially in the Arabic context. A lack of literature exists
on understanding the strategies used by terrorist organizations to disseminate Islamic
radicalized ideologies online, notably those that target the Arab audience.
Many countries have introduced strategies and programs to fight extremist
ideologies and defeat terrorism. Gulf countries continue to attempt various approaches
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to address the problem of radicalization (AlAmeri, 2015). For example, Saudi Arabia
focused on de-radicalization programs that began in 2004 to address the domestic
terrorism facing the country (Porges, 2010). In order to counter-radicalization beliefs
and practices, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) also promoted and enforced nondiscriminatory laws and policies for peaceful coexistence and sustainable society. This
law intends to provide a sound foundation for an environment of tolerance, broadmindedness, and acceptance in the UAE. Moreover, it aims to safeguard people
regardless of their origin, beliefs, or race against acts that promote religious hate and
intolerance (The National, 2015). The law applied not only to real communication and
expressions but also included virtual communication and digital networking. The UAE
and the United States launched the Sawab Center in cooperation with the United States
in 2015 to become one of the first centers to counter ISIL and extremist propaganda
online. The UAE ratified not only international agreements and cooperated in fighting
terrorism but also initiated multiple strategies to counter-radicalization and terrorism.
It launched the Council of Muslim Elders in 2014—the first international body to
promote peace in the Muslim world—and offered to host the Hedayah Center, the
International Center for Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, which opened
in Abu Dhabi in 2012.
Despite the myriad of efforts and strategies from government and nongovernment entities to counter-radicalization, the dissemination of radical ideologies
continued to influence lone wolves to commit attacks even after these efforts.
Although online counter-radicalization efforts and programs have been implemented
in the Arab world, there is still no comprehensive research accessible on the
effectiveness of these efforts in combating radicalization propaganda.
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1.3 Research aims and objectives
This research aims to explore and contribute to tackling the problems
mentioned above. Based on a computational approach, the aim is to 1) identify
radicalization/counter-radicalization social media accounts in the Arab context; 2)
describe the potency of the dissemination of radical Islamic ideologies and counterradical ideologies on social media, focusing on communication content, patterns,
information flow, and networks; 3) explore the key factors and elements used by these
accounts to better understand their social media strategies and tactics; and 4) analyze
and evaluate current online counter-radicalization programs to enhance future
strategies and programs for countering, combating, and mitigating radical ideologies.
After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 will explain the process that creates
terrorists by answering how radicalization and extremism relate to terrorism. Then, it
will present radicalization in social media usage and support the point with two
incidents that affected the global community, one of which specifically affected
Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Later, the chapter will review the literature on
the ISIL along with their strategies, social media networks, patterns, and narratives.
Next, the chapter will move to counter-efforts and introduce literature that evaluates
these undertakings and how future strategies should be executed. Finally, it will
discuss the research topic’s theoretical framework and a few relevant theories,
focusing on social identity theory, the social identity model of deindividuation effects,
and the heuristic-systematic model of information processing.
Chapter 3 will describe the research methodology, computation approach, data
collection method, and how the researcher identified the data set’s seed accounts. This
chapter will further illustrate the steps of identifying, recording, and sorting seed
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accounts. Lastly, the chapter will explain how the data set was analyzed with the types
of tests that were performed.
Chapter 4 will present the research results and findings, which will be divided
into two segments for both data sets. In social network analysis, each data set
(radicalization/counter-radicalization) led to network formation, communities, and
important nodes. Lastly, the chapter explains the results of testing all proposed factors
that influence Twitter engagement.
Chapter 5 is where the researcher will interpret and discuss the findings. This
chapter begins by comparing the results and highlighting mutual and common factors
before outlining the research objectives and the study results. The discussion is
supported by the results based on previous literature and theories. In this chapter, an
explanation and justification are given for each result and finding. In the end, the
chapter summarizes the research contributions and recommendations.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The UAE and other Arab countries have made great strides in fighting
terrorism, specifically Islamist terrorist activities. Fighting terrorism takes many
tactics and forms, and one of these forms is to tackle the factors that fuel Islamist
terrorism and cut out its root causes. One of the most challenging root causes is the
online spread of Islamic ideologies. With the rise of social media, radicalization has
become more accessible to youth, and it is believed to be the first trigger for youth and
Arab Muslims to defect to terrorism. The following literature review is compiled and
designed to explain all relevant materials in this matter.
2.1 Radicalization and Terrorism
Nations around the world have experienced numerous fatal terror attacks. The
most recent occurred during Easter 2019, when Sri Lanka witnessed one of the
deadliest and most coordinated suicide bombings perpetrated by nine men, killing over
250 people (Imtiyaz, 2020). Earlier, a wave of terrorism swept many parts of the
Western world, including the United States, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the
Netherlands, Canada, and Australia (Bakker & de Graaf, 2010). In the aftermath of
these attacks, people assumed terrorism resulted from the attacker’s mindset only
(Macaluso, 2016). Recent terrorist activities are far too complex to be predicted,
prevented, and countered by government efforts. That is why the cooperation of
multiple state actors and non-state actors is a necessity (Melki & Jabado, 2016).
There has been a debate on the role of the Internet, whether primary or
secondary, in promoting and publicizing extremist narratives, facilitating
radicalization and recruitment processes, and reaching a new audience. Given the
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scope and the intensity of the problem, using the Internet and other media outlets to
revert that role and to counter violent extremist narratives has become a global
imperative. As opposed to its effects on radicalization, the Internet can play a vital role
in promoting a counter-narrative and in facilitating counter-radicalization and deradicalization efforts (Ashour, 2010). Many researchers have attempted to establish
causes of, prevent, and create awareness of these violent acts of aggression and to find
methods to counter them. The findings have also revealed the social fuels of terrorism,
such as radicalization and violent extremism.
A growing body of research has closely associated terrorism with several other
concepts. Extremism is an immoderate, uncompromising perspective (Precht, 2007).
Implicitly, extremism does not allow concessions. Extremism is thus a strong belief
outside the norm. These extremist perspectives can threaten public order but are not
national security risks (Precht, 2007). However, extremism can be violent. A violent
extremist uses or supports violence to advance specific political, social, or ideological
beliefs. Violence is used to cause chaos and panic, to undermine public confidence in
the government, and for other reasons. Therefore, violent extremism is defined by
violent actions and a non-concessional belief that the outcome justifies the lives lost.
It may involve genocide and terrorism (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). Radicalization is
conceptually linked to terrorism and occurs within extremist groups. Radicalization is
the process of adopting an extreme perspective or ideology (Precht, 2007). Radical
processes and ideologies often lead to the promotion of violent extremism and
terrorism, as is the case with jihadists (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011).
Violent extremism is a much bigger threat to international peace and security
than terrorism is. According to the definition of violent extremism, the perpetrator’s
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mindset is unreasonable and not willing to bend with regard to their extreme belief.
An act propelled by irrational motivation is more challenging to counter. Terrorism
occurs within the confines of what is rational and reasonable, making such an act less
difficult for government agencies and security services to contain. Another factor
contributing to the greater challenge of violent extremism is the lone wolf attack
(Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). Lone wolves are self-radicalized individuals who
promote their course of beliefs (Bates, 2012). These individuals operate outside of any
organizational or command structure and can be deadlier than terrorist organizations
(Philips, 2011). Their ideologies can be considered to be too extreme, even by other
extremist groups. Lone wolves are also difficult to profile, target, and arrest (Bakker
& de Graaf, 2010).
Radicalization and extremism ultimately lead to terrorism and often start with
individuals who are frustrated with their lives, society, or governments. However, only
a few become terrorists (Precht, 2007). Labeling terrorists should proceed from a clear
understanding of the definition of terrorism. Previously, the definition of terrorism or
terrorist had eluded consensus. However, most studies agreed that “terrorism” consists
of two elements: “actual or threatened violence against civilians or persons not actively
taking part in hostilities,” with “the implicit or explicit purpose of the act being to
intimidate or compel a population, government or organization into some course of
action” (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011).
Globally, many governments are fighting terror and radicalization. The United
Nations developed a four-pillar global counter-terrorism strategy to enhance counterterrorism efforts at the national, regional, and international levels. All UN member
states agreed to this global strategy in 2006 (United Nations, 2006). Additionally,
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many countries also developed anti-terror legislation in the wake of the 9/11 and 7/7
attacks (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). Britain promoted community cohesion to increase
cross-ethnic contacts and prevent terrorism (Thomas, 2010). Violent extremism has
also pushed many governments to adopt different counterapproaches. Efforts to
counter extremist ideologies through radio and social media are used in some places
(United States Department of State Publication, 2018). Offensive methods, such as the
use of military forces to fight networks of violent extremists, are used in many parts
of the world (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011).
Available literature acknowledges that violent extremism and radicalization
need to be defined before planning counter-strategies. Through the identification of
radicalization, the strategies of mitigating problems of ideological extremism can be
implemented (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). Jihadism and other forms of radicalization
founded on religious beliefs have been attributed to the rise of violent extremists who
use terrorism as a way of advancing their irrational, deviated ideas. Besides, selfradicalization has also led to the emergence of so-called lone wolves who have caused
growing concerns. Therefore, there is a need to counter radical ideologies and
extremism since these factors are the fuel of terrorism.
The governments of the world are combating terrorism, but they are less
focused on combating violent extremism and radicalization. Efforts by governments
must include cutting extremist networks and, more importantly, countering radical
ideologies through mainstream and social media. Therefore, understanding radical
ideologies dissemination online will assist in countering radicalization efforts.
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2.2 Radicalization and Social Media
According to experts, social media platforms have provided an easy avenue
through which the public can be united or radicalized. Al Qaeda pioneered the online
presence of its social media forums to wage what is called the “E-Jihad,” recruiting
new members and sympathizers from all around the world (Veilleux-Lepage, 2014).
Social media has also played an essential role during actual terror attacks. In the event
of an attack, social media pictorial posts and messages help the group spread fear,
information chaos, and suspicion within minutes of the attack. Some of the most
common messages that actual militants disseminate include unconfirmed threats,
highly exaggerated figures, and other detailed descriptions of terrorist plans.
Imminently, the group maximizes the difficulty of separating true information from
false information as it flows into social media. Additionally, it is difficult to know if
jihadists, their sympathizers, or neutral internet users post the messages. This loophole
makes social media an incredibly useful asset for terrorist organizations.
The jihadists have various accounts on the three major social media platforms,
including Twitter, Facebook, Myspace, and YouTube (Chatfield, Reddick, &
Brajawidagda, 2015). Others state that terrorist organizations rely on many social
media sites, platforms, and networks to push their messages. Klausen (2015) reported
that Twitter is a favorite because it allows for short, poignant, targeted quips of
propaganda. RAN Centre of Excellence (2015) states that extremists tend to find
networks and spaces where younger people are active because their age group is more
vulnerable to radicalization.
Although terrorist groups use Facebook, Instagram, and other social media
sites, their platform of choice is Twitter. Like Internet forums used to propagate and
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recruit fighters, Twitter has been used as a new platform that serves the same basic
purposes for terrorist organizations (Klausen, 2015). Twitter, one of the main social
media platforms, launched in 2006, giving users the ability to send and read short
messages called “tweets.” Tweets can include plain text, Uniform Resource Locators
(URLs), multimedia, and hashtags. Twitter users’ actions of engagements toward
tweets are displayed in three main forms of comments known as “reply,” a favoriting
function known as “like,” and a sharing function known as “retweet” (Riquelme &
González-Cantergiani, 2016). Its combination of immediacy, the ability to self-select
followers, multi-device access, potential anonymity, and multimedia sharing make it
a primary resource for recruiting and propaganda (Berger & Strathearn, 2013). Other
types of social media platforms require a 3G network or Wi-Fi access (Klausen, 2015).
Twitter’s power had been demonstrated by breaking news of events, including
terrorist attacks, but its capacity to disseminate information and unify followers was
best exemplified by the Arab Spring in 2011. In Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, people
began protesting against government corruption and demanding change. Twitter and,
to a lesser extent, Facebook were pivotal channels whereby users could avoid
government media control, receive pertinent information from around the world, and
present a message that ultimately forced governmental changes in all three countries
(Kassim, 2012).
According to the literature, Twitter is the favorite platform of jihadists and
terrorists due to the type of people who use this platform. It is also clear that Twitter
played a role in influencing social change via the Arab Spring and propaganda. That
is why this research study intends to understand terrorist-organization communication
patterns and networks on Twitter.
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2.3 The Case of Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is one of the radical Islamist
groups that use social media platforms to communicate with followers and
sympathizers and to issue official statements to various local and Western authorities.
ISIL is a transnational terrorist movement that became prominent after it proclaimed
the creation of a caliphate in 2014. This development resulted in a steady stream of
new members from different parts of the world.
ISIL’s strategy is adapted to regional audiences, which means that ISIL is
branding itself and using positioning to enhance its message that it is a supposed agent
of change (a justified avenger whose victory is assured), to appeal to a broader
audience, and to foster recruiting (Farwell, 2014). This sophistication is apparent in
the group’s videos and multimedia messages whose production values benefit from
modern digital techniques (Melki & Jabado, 2016). The world has witnessed many
incidents where ISIL successfully made global headlines. For example, the broadcast
of James Foley’s beheading terrorized Western audiences specifically. Others had a
significant impact on the Arab world, like the burning of the Jordanian pilot Muath Al
Kasasbeh.
ISIL is not the only extremist group using the Internet and social media to
flaunt its attacks, spread its message, and recruit new members. Al-Qaeda, which
emerged from the Russian Afghanistan War, used chat rooms and e-mail to control its
operations and recruitment (Blaker, 2015). European- and U.S.-based neo-Nazi groups
use the Internet as their primary platform for propaganda, while Russian-paid hackers
and military personnel are among the most active purveyors of support systems to
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terrorist groups aligned with Russian global and regional interests (Blaker, 2015;
Combs, 2018).
Russell and Rafiq (2016) emphasize that the narrative’s content is vital to the
radicalization and recruitment of terrorists. The simple version of the narrative is
“Islam is under attack, and we must defend it.” Terrorists tend to keep the message
broad and generalized so that it might apply to people around the globe (Schmid, 2014).
ISIL and, in this regard, the broad narrative that Islam is under attack, is used to recruit
people at the local and international levels. The message is used to radicalize Western
Muslims and gain dominance over other radical Islamic groups such as Al-Qaeda.
According to Russell and Rafiq (2016), ISIL has established more substantial
narratives that are used with targeted populations. When recruiting in Syria and Iraq,
the message is, “The Iraqi and Syrian governments, in cahoots with the CrusaderZionist-Shia alliance, opposed Sunni Islam and did not provide basic services. Join the
Caliphate because we will defend you and provide for you”. The narrative changes
when ISIL tries to recruit members of another terrorist organization: “Our Caliphate is
the only effective means of defending Islam from both the near-enemy and the farenemy.” Finally, to Western Muslims, the message takes the form, “You are not
welcome in the West because you are Muslim, and it is your duty to join our Caliphate
as it is the only way we can defend Islam.”
Beyond the political strategy, ISIL uses technology’s leverage to enhance its
efforts. On Twitter, for example, ISIL uses its network of followers and bot accounts
to repeatedly retweet selected hashtags, to the extent that some have trended globally
(Farwell, 2014), giving ISIL the image of a strong organization and magnifying its
actual size (Combs, 2018). The combination of well-crafted messages and the
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leveraging of attention places ISIL at the forefront of modern-day digital warfare
(Fisher, 2015). So, over time, the accumulation of crafted and targeted content gives
ISIL a deceptive depth that makes potential followers feel that they are entering a
greater cause rather than joining a chaotic terrorist group (Berger & Morgan, 2015).
Even though the ISIL fighters consist of a great deal of Arab/Muslim militants,
most published works have focused on the non-Arab foreign fighters. This
overemphasis on the alien combatants has resulted in a huge gap that needs to be filled
by an academic study that analyzes the reasons behind Arab nationals’ decisions to
join and fight with ISIL. As ISIL does not represent what Arab believe, efforts to
counteract its influence in the MENA region are ongoing. Social media are used to
create response waves that debunk or contradict ISIL messages. At the same time,
efforts are made to pinpoint locations to aid in the investigation and capture of
suspected terrorists (Combs, 2018).
Conversely, with each ISIL member and potential recruit having equal access
to social media, the impact of the central message ISIL strives to control can get
distorted or undermined by individuals pursuing their own agendas. ISIL propaganda,
to some extent, influenced many young Arabs through social media. Take, for example,
the case of Saad Alenazi, a soldier who had been kidnapped by his cousin and shot to
death as a gesture of obeying the leader of ISIL, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Even though
there is no substantial evidence that Twitter and Facebook alone have become
recruiting platforms for ISIL (Alava et al., 2017), they have served it well for global
propaganda.
In conclusion, the ISIL branding strategy in social media relies on both broad
narratives and targeted narratives. Studies noted that ISIL influences their audience
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and gains engagement using nonreligious and mostly social justice narratives. ISIL
also impacts the audience by effectively implementing engagement factors like the
number of followers, hashtags, and sentiment scores. However, there is a lack of
literature focusing on communication strategies used by terrorist organizations on
social media. There is also a lack of literature about ISIL and other similar terrorist
organizations and the recruiting of Arab fighters. Therefore, the study of such
organizations’ communication tactics, propaganda, and network formation in social
media will enrich the literature and shed light on other factors.
2.4 Counter-Radicalization and Violent Extremism Online Efforts
Experts note that counter and alternative narratives are vital for combating
extremism online (Ashour, 2010). Numerous counter-radicalization online programs
have been launched with varying levels of success. According to Russell and Rafiq
(2016), one of the most effective counter-extremism think tanks is Quilliam. Quilliam
is an independent, non-profit organization based in London that deals with countering
radical Islamist groups. Its primary technique is to challenge the narratives promoted
by terrorist organizations and offer counter-narratives (Quilliam, 2018). Another
active counter-radicalization group is Extreme Dialogue—a Canadian-based antiterrorism group dedicated to reducing the overall appeal of extremism among younger
people. The group offers a more positive alternative to extremism and shows
documentaries that tell the personal accounts of Canadians who have been directly and
profoundly impacted by terrorists (Extreme Dialogue, 2018). A similar group exists in
Germany with the same basic operation strategy (Briggs & Feve, 2013). Briggs and
Feve (2013) also report that Abdullah X is yet another counter-narrative initiative that
works with younger people at the grassroots level. It has an online presence and utilizes
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social media sites such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. “By addressing
contemporary and controversial issues relevant to young Muslims, the channel has
been able to garner impressive subscription, sharing, and discussion figures when
compared to other counter-narrative video content online” (RAN Centre of Excellence,
2015).
According to RAN Centre of Excellence (2015), future strategies will likely
focus on three areas: alternative narratives, counter-narratives, and government
strategic communications. Alternative narratives are excellent at undercutting the
extremist narratives by focusing on what they support rather than what they oppose.
The narratives do this by promoting positive stories about various social values,
freedom, democracy, and tolerance (McLean & Syed, 2015). Counter-narratives work
to directly deconstruct radical and violent extremist narratives while simultaneously
discrediting the source of these narratives. They do this by challenging the ideologies
of extremists through a variety of techniques, such as theology, emotion, humor, and
the exposure of untruths. Finally, government strategic communications work to
undermine terrorists’ narratives by rationalizing and explaining government policies.
These communications refute misleading information and help develop productive
narratives with key players and constituencies (RAN Centre of Excellence, 2015).
In conclusion, counter-radicalization efforts suggest that one of the strategies
to effectively counter-radicalization propaganda is to counter the narratives used by
radicalized individuals. Narrative is a key factor in counter-radicalization; therefore,
this research included narratives in understanding online radicalization propaganda
and also evaluated narratives used by counter-radicalization entities as a factor
influencing engagement.
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2.5 Counter-Radicalization in the Arab world
In the Arab world, however, combating extremist and radical organizations
online has been recently addressed. Currently, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)
and the UAE have taken the initiative to counter the dissemination of extremist and
radical ideologies. The KSA, being the nucleus of Islamic religion, has been actively
forming strategies and tactics to fight extremist and radical ideologies, especially when
these ideologies deviate from Islamic principles. Among these efforts is the launching
of the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideologies, also known as Etidal. The
Etidal Center was established by King Salman bin Abdulaziz and President Donald
Trump during the 2017 Riyadh Summit. The center was tasked with refuting hate and
extremist speech, promoting concepts like moderation and accepting others, and
producing media content that confronts that of radical groups to defy it and reveal it as
promotional propaganda (Al Arabiya, 2017). The center aims to be the global reference
in combating extremist ideology and promoting moderation (Etidal, 2018). The UAE,
in line with KSA, has made many efforts in this direction, such as establishing national
institutions that aim to fight violence and extremism. The International Institutes for
Tolerance, Hedayah, and Sawab are some examples of these efforts.
The Hedayah center (“hedayah” is Arabic for “guidance”) has been based in
the United Arab Emirates since 2012. The center, in conjunction with the European
Union, launched the STRIVE (Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism)
Global program (Hedayah Center, 2018). Hedayah functions as the leading hub for
policymakers, practitioners, and researchers of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE),
enhancing the understanding of and sharing good practices for building the capacity
of CVE actors around the globe to promote tolerance, stability, and security. It
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addresses current threats to CVE by organizing capacity-building activities and
workshops (UAE Government portal, 2020). The UAE and the USA co-founded
Sawab, an online engagement initiative in support of the global coalition against
extremism. Sawab seeks to give a voice to millions of Muslims and others around the
world who stand united against terrorism and religious misinterpretation. The center
works with religious leaders, organizations, businesses, and youth in order to amplify
their voices, challenge extremist doctrines of hate and intolerance, and demonstrate
the true values of the UAE community (UAE Government portal, 2020).
Studies conducted in the Middle East noted that future counter-narrative
campaigns should put less emphasis on preventing radicalized individuals from
traveling to the so-called “caliphate” and more focus on 1) preventing individuals and
small cells from carrying out attacks in their home countries; 2) reintegrating returning
foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs); and 3) preventing migration to other Daesh
strongholds, both inside and outside the region (Elsayed, Faris, & Zeiger, 2017). It is
also essential to understand how terrorists convey their propaganda and the rationale
behind their narrative online. According to Elsayed et al. (2017), there are three types
of narratives used by terrorists. The first type is political and military narratives, which
utilize statements of political or military objectives and justify terrorism. The second
type of narrative includes religious and ideological arguments. Jihadists call people to
return to what they claim to be the “true” Islam. Religious arguments reference both
the Qur’an and Hadith to establish religious authority and legitimacy. The third
narrative type, commonly used by ISIL in the MENA region, is concerned with social
and heroic arguments. Social and heroic narratives may contain underlying religious
language and themes but are not direct religious arguments.
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Following the methods and suggestions made by experts, it is evident that
terrorist organizations used several tactics to disseminate terror and recruit fighters via
social media. These tactics consist of the implementation of content or contextual
factors that predict high engagements. Factors such as network, type of message, and
type of narrative play a role in terrorists’ propaganda and audience engagements.
Counter-radicalization experts group content and contextual factors by social network
factors. Social network factors also play an important role in social media propaganda,
and one way to challenge terrorists’ propaganda is by filtering and taking down their
presence online. The two main tools of filtering and taking down accounts can benefit
from pattern-recognition analyses and digital trackback technologies to identify more
users, accounts, and uploads. To identify more radical accounts, text analyses can flag
certain types of messages and the people who are linking to or following them in order
to create a more accurate picture of the distributed network (Badaway & Ferrara, 2018).
At that point, major nodes in the network can be targeted for tracking or takedown
with specific critical accounts as strategic options (Rowe & Saif, 2016), which are used
by U.S. counterintelligence to take down Mexican drug cartels (Farwell, 2014).
2.6 User Engagement Studies
Since the beginning of social media, social networks have become crucial
avenues for communication. Among these sites is Twitter, which is a microblogging
platform that enables quick short message dissemination (Han et al., 2019). Thus, such
platforms present opportunities for faster and cheaper communication to wider
audiences compared to the conventional mass media. A unique feature of Twitter is its
real-time conversation nature that encourages and supports interactive engagements
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with users. This characteristic makes Twitter an instrumental site for analyzing user
engagement.
Generally, user engagement is an essential aspect of studying social media
influence that has several benefits. First, it reveals how users can use these sites'
dominance in improving marketing and communication with users. In fact, studies
have shown that 91 percent of organizations do not fully understand how they can
effectively engage their target audiences on social media platforms (Jaakonmaki et al.,
2017). Therefore, studying user engagements provides a useful and practical criterion
for assessing social media usage's success. Such information can be used by
organizations and governments to determine the kind of information to disseminate.
For instance, Twitter endorses real-time conversations making it suitable for
engagements. On the other hand, Facebook is noted as primarily being a broadcasting
kind of medium ideal for announcements that do not heavily rely on feedback (Read
et al., 2019). Such distinctions can only be understood through the study of the nature
of user engagements in different social media platforms through in-depth research.
Different ways exist through which user engagement can be tested. However,
most of the performed tests aim to measure the number of interactions and responses
generated from the contents on social platforms. How this measurement is conducted
depends on the social media site in question, but it often involves evaluating the
percentage of users reacting to a post (Jaakonmaki et al., 2017). In describing the
standard user engagement metrics used, Twitter and Facebook can be used as case
examples due to their immense popularity and dominance. The first metric regards
feedback generated from a post. In this regard, Facebook uses comments, while
Twitter uses replies. Usually, these form the most crucial metric as researchers can
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determine engagement aspects such as sentiment scores. The second metric is the
number of likes, which is used as an indication that a user agrees with specific content
or information (Han et al., 2019). Such metrics can enable organizations to understand
the preferences of users and identify potential customers on these platforms. The other
measurement is a function that signifies endorsement. On Facebook, it is represented
by the number of shares, while on Twitter, it is the number of retweets. Both functions
usually serve to disseminate some content to a broader audience. In this regard, a
Twitter user retweets information that is seen by their followers, and on Facebook, a
user shares content that is then viewed by friends. Therefore, the typical user
engagement metrics include likes, retweets, shares, comments, and replies.
Since user engagement plays a crucial role in understanding social media usage
and influence, this research will investigate radicalization and counter-radicalization
Twitter influence based on user engagement. Most studies focused on likes, retweets,
or replies counts as metrics of user engagement. This research will include these three
metrics (likes, retweets, and replies) as user engagement and explore factors that
influence these metrics.
As seen in the literature, this research is unique for several reasons. First, the
research will focus on analyzing the communication and propaganda on Twitter
accounts from the lists of UAE terrorist individuals and organizations. Second, it will
emphasize the impact of radicalization propaganda that targets the UAE audience
specifically, and the Arab world in general, by analyzing the Arabic content and
context of these accounts. Moreover, it will incorporate computational methods to
understand the tactics and patterns used not only to propagate radicalization but also
used in counter-radicalization efforts to combat radicalization on Twitter. Lastly, there
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is a noticeable lack of literature and research that is tailored to assess and evaluate
combating online radicalization and violent extremism. Overall, this research will
contribute to the UAE literature on radicalization specifically and will add to the
literature on combating online radicalization propaganda and violent extremism.
2.7 Big Data and Computational Methods
An increase in the amount of information on the internet has contributed
significantly to the use of computational methods-big data in various industries. In the
past ten years, computational big data approaches in the social science fields have
increased in usage due to the availability of large-scale digital data that people create
(Deutschmann et al., 2020). In their research, Deutschmann et al. (2020) used big data
to study computational conflict research by combining data from different scholars
with diverse backgrounds. The researchers used scholars with mathematics, physics
and biology, data sociology, and political science expertise (Deutschmann et al., 2020).
The investigators improvised computational approaches such as machine learning,
topic modeling, social network approaches, agent-based modeling, and automated
content analysis (Deutschmann et al., 2020). The researchers provided an overview of
the way the method has impacted conflict research and consolidated the emerging field
of computational research (Deutschmann et al., 2020).
Big data and computational methods help to analyze people's network behavior,
communication, and pattern and restore customer engagement for marketers (Liu et al.,
2019). Before the emergence of technology and the internet, companies relied mainly
on customer's purchase behaviors to determine their relationship or brand loyalty (Liu
et al., 2019). They also used the same method to measure overall corporate
performance and therefore failed to capture the consumer's active role in influencing a
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broad entity framework (Liu et al., 2019). For example, the method could not enable
marketers to determine potential consumers from the general public. After the
emergence of a big data framework, companies can currently manage to predict
people's interactions with their brands and also facilitate marketing objectives (Liu et
al., 2019).
In 2019, Valdez et al. published an article where they presented agent-based
models, social network analysis, natural language processing, and search engine
methods as computational tools that can help analyze individual and group behavior,
as well as make sense of big data. These models can be extremely useful in analyzing
social media platforms. Social network analysis, for example, is mainly used to
identify the relationships between people in groups and the influence that each person
carries (Valdez et al., 2019). This model applies graph theory to assign individuals and
their relationships with different characters in the graph. For example, the individuals
in a group are referred to as nodes, while their interactions or relationships are referred
to as links (Valdez et al., 2019). Furthermore, adjacency matrices are created from the
data to further represent the relationships within the group. The group's opinion leaders
are revealed by analysis of how often people communicate, who talks the most, or who
has large followership (Valdez et al., 2019). The social network analysis model is
useful in analyzing an organization's teams to identify their most influential members
(Valdez et al., 2019). Therefore, the social network analysis model can monitor the
spread of extremism or hate speech on social media by identifying individuals with the
most shared or followed posts and their interactions with followers. Giving its potential,
computational methods could be the approach to analyze large amounts of data and
provide conclusive information about Twitter analysis on accounts that promote
radicalization or counter-radicalization.
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2.8 Research Questions
This research aims to understand how radicalized ideologies disseminate
through social media and how these ideologies can be countered. By understanding
the tactics and strategies used by both sides, an effective conclusion will help assess
and modify current and future strategies. Therefore, the research questions were
designed based on clarifying the steps that lead to understanding radicalization
propaganda and counter-radicalization on social media. Since the researcher focused
on Twitter, the following research questions were constructed:
1. What are the patterns of community, network, and information flow among
radicalization accounts?
2. What are the patterns of community, network, and information flow among
counter-radicalization accounts?
3. What factors lead to the engagement of radicalization accounts?
4.

What factors lead to the engagement of counter-radicalization accounts?

5. What are the differences between radicalization and counter-radicalization
accounts in their patterns of community, network, information flow, and
factors leading to the engagement?
2.9 Theoretical Background
Two principal theories were used based on their relevance to the study. The
theories used are the social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE) and the
heuristic-systemic mode (HSM) of information processing. The SIDE and HSM model
are used together as ground theories to understand radicalization and counterradicalization and clarify content and context factors that influence engagements.
These two theories were suggested and applied by several scholars in understanding
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computer-mediated communication, especially in social media. SIDE model is
relevant to the understanding of networks, patterns, and behavior of individuals in a
group situation (i.e., radicalization), and HSM is suitable for explaining information
processing modes of messages consumed by an individual in a social network situation.
2.9.1 The Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Effect
The social identity model of deindividuation is among the various
deindividuation theories. Its two main theoretical building blocks are social identity
theory and deindividuation effects, in which social identity theory is mostly concerned
with how individuals identify themselves as part of society or a social group. The
deindividuation theoretical approaches, on the other hand, explain that individuals are
likely to show uninhibited behaviors when they are part of a group.
According to social identity theory, groups help to define the identity of the
individual members of the group and how they should relate to others in the group
(Vilanova, Beria, Costa, & Koller, 2017). As these authors further explain, identity
constitutes the group of which the individual is a member. The fact that such
individuals act under the group’s rules does not de-characterize their personality.
Instead, “what occurs is an overlap of the more collective aspects of personality at the
expense of the more individual aspects” (Vilanova et al., 2017).
The other component of the SIDE draws on the deindividuation effect theory,
which focuses on how the individual behaves as part of a crowd, or the herd mentality,
thereby losing their self-awareness. Deindividuation theory is associated with Le Bon,
who attempted to study mob-like behavior during the French Revolution and observed
that individuals are capable of destructive impulses when they submerge their self-

26
restraint to the will of the group (Mikal, Rice, Kent, & Uchino, 2014). Vilanova et al.
(2017) elaborate on the idea. According to the SIDE, “the variables that cause
deindividuation minimize opportunities to highlight individual differences,
emphasizing the group aspect of the situation.”
In merging the social identity theory and deindividuation effects theory, the
SIDE approach overcomes the limitations of the previous deindividuation theories.
Deindividuation theory assumes that people have rational and social sides of
themselves that are in opposition, implying that the individual loses the rational self in
group contexts (Mikal et al., 2014). So, the individual acts rationally when alone and
irrationally when part of the group when he or she becomes subsumed by the crowd
behavior or mentality.
The SIDE approach changes the thinking that individuals in certain conditions
will demonstrate antinormative behavior as a natural consequence to the idea that in
such circumstances, the individual personality is still alive and that even the displayed
behavior is not antinormative but rather normative for that particular situation
(Vilanova et al., 2017). The addition of social identity theory to deindividuation also
becomes a notable complement of SIDE in that it considers matters of identity in the
sense that groups are formations with identities.
The SIDE model is considered to be strong in explaining and understanding
intragroup and intergroup behavior in its close observance of the way people behave
in group situations (Wang, 2018). Some researchers have noted the theory as the one
that best explains results on deindividualization and the most promising framework for
analyzing crowd or group behavior (Vilanova et al., 2017). Recent research efforts
have focused on online group behavior. One of these efforts is a study made by Mikal
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et al. (2014), where the results show how even with 75 million visitors to the website,
Imgur supports its group identity, with users modifying their behaviors to align with
the website’s culture. This study shows that websites are one possible area in which
the group identity is permitted to achieve a salience distinct from the individual, as the
SIDE perspective maintains. Given such a scenario, there would be scope for prosocial
and positive identities online, underpinned by the mentality suggested by the SIDE
model. For instance, various hashtag movements around the globe have organized
themselves into groups on a moral crusade against socio-economic injustices.
2.9.2 The Heuristic-systematic Model of Information Processing Theory
The heuristic-systematic model (HSM) argues that people simultaneously use
a heuristic and systematic model of information processing. The systematic model is
deliberative and, thus, more time-consuming. It involves the careful processing of a
message based on its content and the individual’s quality and relevance assessment. In
contrast, the heuristic model of information processing is simplified and rapid. It
reduces the individual’s cognitive load by using heuristics, or simplified decisionmaking rules, to assess the message (Zhang, Peng, Zhang, Wang, & Zhu, 2014).
A key point that distinguishes the HSM from other dual-mode models of
information processing is its argument that, rather than competing, the systematic and
heuristic modes are co-occurring. The effect of simultaneous mode use might be
additive, with both modes pushing toward either a stronger acceptance or rejection of
a message. Conversely, one mode might establish a bias that impacts the outcome of
the other mode, such as when an individual judge a persuasive argument to be stronger
because heuristic processing predisposes one to accept the argument’s conclusion. In
general, the systemic mode will show a stronger influence when the individual decides
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that it is vital to judging an argument accurately. In contrast, the heuristic mode will
show a stronger influence when the individual is more motivated to minimize cognitive
effort (Kim, 2015).
2.10 Hypothesis
2.10.1 SIDE, HSM, and Social Media
As discussed above, while online social movements can be a positive force to
drive social change or awareness of social injustices, the same can be said for
radicalized ideological groups that fuel sentiments of hate or violence.
While the online terrorist strategy might not have identified the SIDE model
explicitly as a key conceptual pillar of their propaganda, the fundamental concepts are
present. However, understanding the role that terrorists and radical groups play in
radicalized ideologies and propaganda helps craft more effective counter-strategies to
weaken their efforts at recruiting and self-glorification. As noted by Farwell (2014),
ISIL places itself as the truest apostles of a sovereign faith at the forefront of change
for Islam and as a champion of what it defines as social justice. In this form, one can
see the role of social identity: ISIL calls itself a “champion,” “apostle,” “avenger,” and
“defender,” clearly establishing that “they” are attacking and hurting “us.” The
recruiting appeal is evident: To join ISIL is to become part of a crusade; it immediately
makes a person feel important on the world stage. The recruit becomes a soldier in a
battle where the line between good and evil is drawn, and one can suspend judgment
and compassion because their cause is “right,” and anyone against it is less than human.
The SIDE theory also may be useful to invoke the nature of online groups’
behaviors towards radicalism. There is a lack of literature that uses the SIDE model
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concerning online platforms of a radical nature. However, there are emerging studies
that have focused on ISIL, including its use of social media in its recruitment drives,
which used the social cognitive theory and the social identity theory as a theoretical
framework (Al Raffie, 2013; Awan, 2017). Given that the social identity theory is
conceptually closer to SIDE, there is potential that the SIDE approach could also be
used in studies of cyber-terrorism. In what could be an attempt to fill the gap in
considering the SIDE approach in cyber-terrorism, a research study was undertaken
by researchers in the Netherlands to investigate the extent to which counter-narrative
programs, through the use of social media, could be useful (Van Eerten et al., 2017).
Along with the various theoretical frameworks considered in the study, the
SIDE model was regarded as one which could be influential in predicting that when
people reach a certain level of extremity, they are less likely to be influenced by
counter-messaging efforts (Van Eerten et al., 2017). The study considers the use of
counter-narratives to mitigate radicalization difficult, as ideological narratives about
perceived grievances are often drawn from deep-rooted experiences of everyday life.
Hence, counter-narratives may be limited in influencing people with long-held views
borne by their experiences.
As explained earlier, network formation is one of the critical elements used in
ISIL online propaganda. They form multiple accounts and use relevant hashtags to
ensure expansion and increased message reach through Twitter. Identifying a social
media user from Twitter who has accumulated thousands of interactive and engaged
followers constitutes one aspect of examining factors that drive their numbers.
Terrorists have succeeded in luring hundreds of youths, using social media propaganda
as one of their recruitment tools. Since statistics showed many ISIL foreign fighters
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are Arab national (Benmelech & Klor, 2016), it is safe to assume dissemination of
radical ideas in social media is stronger than counter-radical ideologies. Therefore, the
following is hypothesized:
H1: Radicalization accounts have stronger social networks than CounterRadicalization accounts.
Van Eerten et al. (2017) used a combination of four theories as theoretical
frameworks, suggesting that a composite of theories could be worth exploring when
studying online radical ideologies. SIDE theory can complement other approaches and
provide new insights and explanations. For instance, Awan’s (2017) study concluded
that people who are likely to sympathize with the ISIL’s narrative seek an adrenaline
rush and excitement. However, it is doubtful that ISIL recruiters would want to attract
people who are seeking excitement but are oblivious to the ideology and the
organization’s cause. Nevertheless, in terms of the SIDE model, a norm-based
influence would be considered and may be present in online formations. So, in the
instance of cyber-terrorism, it becomes useful to understand the extent to which groupbased norms may be attractive to group members.
In terms of the research question about how terrorists invoke their radical
extremist ideologies online and, more specifically, on Twitter, the SIDE model, as a
framework, should be considered in terms of understanding group norm-based
influence. Since the SIDE model has been used in computer-mediated communication
to understand group dynamics, it could be promising for online studies, which is the
main objective of this research. However, in any study of the online dissemination of
radical ideologies, a much deeper, comprehensive understanding of how these
ideologies influence people is desired. There could be several factors to ponder, given
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that radical organizations may be continuously adapting and developing new strategies
to appeal to sympathizers. Therefore, the research will use the SIDE framework, which
may offer new insights into online radicalization, and complement it with another
theory that focuses on the deeper factors.
The HSM can be an interesting model in studying social media influence
because it predicts several likely effects of content and contexts. When an individual’s
systemic mode is dominant, the content such as message type, narrative, sentiment,
and using hashtags should have a more significant influence on decisions to follow and
share posts from a given social media account. When the heuristic mode is dominant,
contextual factors, such as the identity of the account, should play a more significant
role. For example, when primarily using the heuristic mode, an individual might be
more likely to accept (and, thus, follow or share) information from a respected
institutional or international source (Zhang et al., 2014). Other context factors
according to HSM are follower counts, account age, tweeting frequency, and
publishing time. HSM could be used as a grounded theory for identifying the factors
that influence radical and counter-radical messages on Twitter and for predicting
Twitter engagement based on content and contextual elements. By testing these factors,
the research was able to identify factors that influence engagement for both radical and
counter-radical accounts.
According to HSM, social media dissemination factors can be categorized into
two main categories: context and content. In this study, context includes factors that
are contextual to Twitter, such as messenger type, follower count, tweet frequency,
and publishing time. Whereas content factors are factors derived from Twitter content,
such as narratives, message type, sentiment, and hashtags.
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2.10.2 Contextual Factors
A study conducted by Zhang et al. (2014) found contextual factors have less
impact than content factors on social media influence. The most significant contextual
factor is the combination of user activity (overall frequency of posting) and the number
of followers. Frequent posters with few followers have a higher influence than less
frequent posters. Still, frequent posters with higher follower counts enjoy heightened
influence. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
H2a: In radicalization accounts, more frequent tweeting results in higher account
engagement.
H2b: In counter-radicalization accounts, more frequent tweeting results in higher
account engagement.
Several studies have been conducted to analyze the impact of author type,
especially on Twitter. One such research is the Shugars and Beauchamp (2019) study,
which found that users’ popularity determined the number of replies and likes they
received. In particular, they found that tweets from famous persons were more likely
to receive responses (Shugars & Beauchamp, 2019). This finding was supported by
the notion that users’ perceptions of the author influenced their interaction with the
author’s content. Likewise, the study reported that users whose accounts were verified
and had a significant number of followers had a slightly higher likelihood of receiving
a response and like (Shugars & Beauchamp, 2019). In particular, political figures were
analyzed to determine the factors accelerating more engagements. In this regard, the
researchers found that verified political authors received more engagements, both
negative and positive. Reflecting on that, account type or messenger is considered to
be a factor that may influence engagement. Zhang et al. (2014) interpret the account
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type in terms of perceived authority. Celebrity and organizational accounts enjoyed a
substantial boost in popularity compared to individual accounts. Perceived authority
can be applied in radicalization networks to those who inspire radical ideologies,
which mainly present in terms of religious values and virtues conveyed by radical
religious scholars. In counter-radicalization, the government is the main authority that
fights terrorism, eliminating all radical and extremist ideologies. Therefore, these are
the hypotheses:
H3: Religious scholars’ radicalization accounts gain higher engagement than
organization and supporter account types.
H4: Government counter-radicalization accounts gain higher engagement than
independent and individual account types.
As explained earlier, social media play an essential role during terror attacks.
Instantaneous social media pictorial posts and messages help the group spread fear,
information chaos, and suspicion within minutes of the attack. Some of the messages
most disseminated by militants include unconfirmed threats, highly exaggerated
figures, and other detailed descriptions of terrorist plans. In Muslim communities,
religious events or terrorist attack dates can be considered as potential dates to publish
tweets that may attract a broader audience. Radicalization accounts use Islamic events,
like the holy month of Ramadan, to disseminate their propaganda targeting the Muslim
audience. Alternatively, counter-radicalization accounts potentially publish tweets to
condemn terrorist activities on the day of any attack as a reaction and counter-efforts
to minimize the terrorist impact. Thus, religious events and terrorist attacks date could
be special days to attract engagements in both radicalization and counter-radicalization
accounts. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:

34
H5a: In radicalization accounts, tweets published on special days induces higher
Engagement than posts published on regular days.
H5b: In counter-radicalization accounts, tweets published on special days induces
higher Engagement than posts published on regular days.
2.10.3 Content Factors
As previously explained, counter-radicalization efforts in the Arab world
suggested that narrative type could be one of the terrorist tactics to propagate their
messages. For Instance, Russell and Rafiq (2016) emphasize that narrative content is
vital to the radicalization and recruitment of terrorists. Another study by Sulaimi
(2017) that analyzes violence and incitement narratives used in ISIL’s speech
concludes that the majority of ISIL’s narrative consists of the social identity and
cohesiveness that ISIL claims to offer. ISIL’s strategies target socially isolated
audiences and lure them not by using religious or political narratives but instead by
using social narratives and content that explicitly ignite hostility towards social
purposes. Using the three categories of narratives suggested in the literature, narrative
hypotheses are constructed as the following:
H6a: Using social and heroic narratives will increase tweets' Engagement in
radicalized accounts.
H6b: Using social and heroic narratives will increase tweet engagement in counterradicalized accounts.
Zhang et al. (2014) suggests that more information is contained in the messages
that correlate with high user engagement. In his study, he concludes that longer posts
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are shared more often but elicit fewer comments, whereas the inclusion of an internet
link is negatively correlated with influence. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
H7a: In radicalization accounts, the longer the tweet, the higher the Engagement.
H7b: In counter-radicalization accounts, the longer the tweet, the higher the
Engagement.
Another study carried out by Shafawi and Hassan (2018), focusing on the
Twitter accounts of libraries, found that information quality had a positive impact on
post influence, as measured by retweet behavior. Previous studies suggested that image
usage, positive sentiments, and account age promote increased audience engagement
(Kim, 2015; Hwong et al., 2017). Bhattacharya, Srinivasan, and Polgreen (2017)
focused on the influence (measured as user engagement via commenting) of the
Facebook accounts of U.S. health agencies. This study showed that a post’s inclusion
of photos or videos and the expression of positive sentiment were both strongly
correlated with influence. Thus, the following is hypothesized:
H8a: In radicalization accounts, images and videos have higher Engagement than pure
text.
H8b: In counter-radicalization accounts, images and videos have higher Engagement
than pure text.
A study by Fischer et al. (2019) that analyzed a hashtag news community on
Twitter in which positive sentiments were found to be helpful. The community
involved high school science teachers who shared resources and organized
professional learning (Fischer et al., 2019). The results obtained showed that positive
sentiments, especially regarding laboratory investigations and professional learning
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activities, produced a higher number of retweets and likes. Overall, the authors found
that optimistic tweets were associated with 0.44 higher tweet engagement, while
negative sentiments resulted in no significant change (Fischer et al., 2019). Thus, the
following is hypothesized:
H9a: In radicalization accounts, positive sentiments have a higher Engagement than
negative sentiments.
H9b: In counter-radicalization accounts, positive sentiments have a higher
Engagement than negative sentiments.
Abbas et al. (2018), examining retweeting behavior, found that the contextual
factor of temporal novelty plays a significant role in determining the popularity or
influence of social media postings. Studies concluded that extremists use their network
of followers and bot accounts to repeatedly retweet selected hashtags to the extent that
some have trended globally (Farwell, 2014). A hashtag aids user in search of relevant
information on a topic. Using appropriate hashtags may improve the visibility of a
tweet and increase user engagement. Further, accounts can use hashtags to create a
community of users. As such, it is highly effective in driving user engagement (Han et
al., 2019). Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
H10a: In radicalization accounts, tweets with hashtags have higher Engagement than
posts without hashtags.
H10b: In counter-radicalization accounts, tweets with hashtags have higher
Engagement than posts without hashtags.
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2.10.4 Research Framework
In preparing the hypotheses mentioned above, a research framework was
constructed to represent the research factors that influence engagement.
Radicalization explained in Figure 1 (a) and counter-radicalization accounts described
in Figure 1 (b).
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Figure 1: Research Framework (a) Radicalization (b) Counter-Radicalization
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Chapter 3: Methods
3.1 Computational method
This research used the computational method to analyze social media data on
radicalization/counter-radicalization Twitter activities in the Arab world. The amount
and variety of social media content created by terrorist organizations and counterradicalization efforts, even if solely limited to Twitter, requires a broad-based,
computer-driven methodology that can quickly identify patterns and behavior that
possibly define strategies or communication tactics the terrorist groups employ.
Why are the computational methods used? Over the past century, there has
been plenty of social theory, but there have been severe constraints on access to data
(Golder & Macy, 2014). Using the computational approach overcomes two significant
barriers to the acceptance of scientific research on complex problems. It also supports
credibility through a thorough process of data collection, analysis, and tested models,
which leads to a higher possibility of reproducing the results by independently
applying the developed model to the same data (Stodden, 2010).
According to Meier (2020), computational methods leverage social network
analysis, but the assessment is broad. The field can be supplemented by elements that
separate multiple forms of dyadic links. The links can then be used to model
similarities in terms of engagement and social relationships, among other interactions.
The tools can be examined as a broader discipline of computer and information science,
where several applications of network analysis can be found. To this end,
computational methods can be viewed as tools that can be used to investigate social
networks such as Twitter and how information is diffused among influencers to
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ascertain the popularity of a post or content. Thus, computational methods are arguably
essential in determining information behavior.
In essence, the computational approach uses numerical and/or nonnumerical
algorithms, computational models, and other selected programming inputs to identify
and gather specified data, analyze it in the requested methods, identify patterns to
establish conceptualizations, and then continue collecting and analyzing data to adjust
the conceptualization until it can be perceived as a valid and reliable model (Stieglitz
& Dang-Xuan, 2012).
As discussed in the literature, social network analysis (SNA) has great potential
in studies that analyze and evaluate Twitter accounts. SNA identifies how people
influence each other in groups and determine the influence each person creates in the
team. SNA provides an easy way to find out the connections between networks and
actors. It can help analyze how different activities are being carried out through social
media platforms. It helps in linking people with the same values, ideas, visions,
disagreements, and social contacts. It is made possible through the use of social
networks made of nodes that help identify social networks.
3.2 Research Procedures
This research aims to understand how terrorist organizations and counterradicalization organizations use Twitter to disseminate their messages by analyzing
their network formation and information flow and identifying factors that influence
social media users to gain engagement and exposure. Therefore, the researcher
constructed the research methodology structure (Figure 2) and followed the steps to
achieve the research objectives.
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Figure 2: Research Procedures
First of all, the researcher began by identifying seed accounts. The process of
identifying seed accounts will be explained later in this chapter. Then, after identifying
the seed accounts for both radicalization and counter-radicalization, data collection is
performed using software tools in a process that is further explained in the data
collection section. Twitter seed accounts information is collected and categorized into
two main data sets: content and context data. Then, these data are tested via three test
analyses depending on the variable inputs, as mentioned in Figure 2. These variables
are all tested to predict tweet engagement. Therefore, the following sections are
designed per the research framework to first define the research variables and then
explain in detail the processes of identifying seed accounts, data collection, and data
analysis.
3.2.1 Research Variables
As mentioned in the literature review, tweet engagement is presented in three
forms of action. These actions are displayed as likes, retweets, and replies. For each
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tweet, a number is shown next to each action. This number represents the count of each
action in response to the tweet. The counts of likes, retweets, and replies in this
research are the dependent variable. Therefore, the term “Engagement” in this research
refers to the likes, retweets, and replies counts. On the other hand, factors that influence
Engagement were tested based on the research hypotheses mentioned earlier. Content
and context factors were then operationalized into a research framework that identifies
all independent variables as explained in Figure 3.
Image or video
URL
Message Type
Pure text
Mix

Content

Political or
Military
Religious or
Ideological
Narrative Type

Social or hearoic

Hashtag

Promotion

Reply
Positive
Sentiment
Negative
Special Day
Publishing Time

Context

Regular Day
Tweet
Frequency

Tweet counts /
Account age
Religious
Scholar

Follower Count
Radicalization

Organization

Supporter
Messenger Type
Government
Counterradicalization

Independent
Individual

Figure 3: Independent Variables
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Independent variables are set to be tested against engagement. These variables
were identified and operationalized based on the factors that influence Engagement
suggested by the literature as shown in Figure 1. Content variables consist of four
independent variables, which are:
•

Type of Message refers to the tweet format, where categorized as the
following:

•

•

Plain text: the tweet contains text format only.

•

Image: the tweet contains an image or a photo format only.

•

URL: the tweet contains a website.

•

Mix: the tweet contains a combination of two formats.

Narrative Type: refers to the tweet narrative category. Narrative types are
categorized into five classes: political and military, religious or ideological,
social or heroic, promotion, and reply. The first three are suggested by Elsayed
et al. (2017) in their research. The last two classes are added to accommodate
the data set in this research. These types are explained further in the data
analysis section.

•

Type of sentiment: refers to the score of the tweet sentiment. This score ranges
from +1 to −1. The process of coding and calculating the sentiment is further
explained in the data analysis section.

•

Hashtag: refers to whether the tweet contains hashtags or not.
In addition, context variables were also identified and operationalized. Context

variables consist of four independent variables, which are:
•

Publishing Time: refers to the date the tweet was published.

•

Tweet Frequency: refers to the rate of tweets per day.
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•

Follower Count: refers to the number of accounts that follow an account.

•

Type of Messenger: refers to the type of the seed account. Each account from
the radicalization/counter-radicalization seed accounts was categorized into
three types, which are:
•

•

Radicalization Accounts:
•

Organization (OR): refers to a terrorist organization account.

•

Religious Scholar (RS): refers to a religious scholar account.

•

Supporter (SU): refers to a terrorist supporter account.

Counter-Radicalization:
•

Government: Refers to a government account.

•

Individual: Refers to an individual account.

•

Independent: Refers to a nongovernmental organization or group.

3.3 Identifying Seed Accounts
This section will clarify the process of identifying seed accounts of both
radicalization and counter-radicalization accounts. This process resulted in a total of
136 radicalization accounts and 75 counter-radicalization accounts.
3.3.1 Radicalization Accounts
Radicalization accounts, in this study, refer to Twitter accounts that promote
radical Islamic ideologies and beliefs. As discussed earlier in the literature, all
terrorists are radical, and Twitter has always been a fertile ground for terrorists to
promote their radical messages. Therefore, the researcher used the UAE Lists of
Terrorist Organizations and Terrorist Individuals obtained from the Emirates News
Agency (WAM) which is the official news agency of the UAE as seen in Table 1. Then,
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the researcher searched for all organizations and individuals listed in the UAE Lists of
Terrorist Organizations and Terrorist Individuals and recorded the accounts after
validating their Twitter accounts. In total, 136 radicalization seed accounts have been
identified and recorded (Appendix I).

Table 1: UAE Lists of Terrorist Organizations and Terrorist Individuals
Issuance Date

Title

Source

23 October 2018 UAE Cabinet of
Ministers’
Resolution No.
50 of 2018
28 May 2018
UAE Cabinet of
Ministers’
Resolution No.
24 of 2018
9 November
UAE Cabinet of
2017
Ministers’
Resolution No.
45 of 2017
6 August 2017
UAE Cabinet of
Ministers’
Resolution No.
28 of 2017
12 June 2017
UAE Cabinet of
Ministers’
Resolution No.
18 of 2017

http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302715685

15 November
2014

http://wam.ae/ar/details/1395272465559

UAE Cabinet of
Ministers’
Resolution No.
41 of 2014

http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302688226

http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302641591

http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302624655

http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302618259

(WAM 2, 2018; WAM 1, 2018; WAM 3, 2017; WAM 2, 2017; WAM 1, 2017; WAM, 2014)

The identification of radicalization seed-accounts was performed using two
types of search-engine software: Google and Twitter. Google search-engine software
is widely used to find indexed information about individuals or entities on the Internet.
Google search-engine queries were performed by typing the name of the terrorist
individual or terrorist organization and browsing the query’s results for any
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information about a relevant Twitter account. After identifying Twitter accounts found
in the query results, several verification measures—such as username, profile
description or affiliation, current location, number of tweets, number of followers, and
tweet content—were tested manually to validate the ownership of the account, as
shown in Appendix II.
The Twitter search engine was applied when the first method failed to produce
any indication of a Twitter account. Twitter’s search engine, which is similar to
Google’s search engine, was used to search for terrorist individuals or organizations
by typing the first and last names of terrorists and a combination of all names in Arabic.
However, queries were restricted to the “people” tab, which only searches for account
usernames. After each query, all resulting accounts were verified using verification
measures similar to those used earlier in Google. An example of the Twitter search
method is presented in Appendix III.
For the study, accounts with fewer than 100 tweets and 100 followers or with
non-Arabic content were excluded. Radicalization seed accounts were recorded and
put into one of three categories: religious scholars (RS), organization (OR), or
supporter (SU). Terrorist individuals were categorized either as RS or OR, depending
on their affiliation, as mentioned in the UAE list (Table 1). Terrorist organizations
were categorized as OR or SU. The OR category referred to any terrorist organization
accounts that mentioned being the official organization account in their Twitter
description (Table 1). Other accounts that were neither RS nor OR were categorized
as SU.
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After identifying Twitter accounts and filtering them, a table was created. The
list of all radicalization seed accounts is shown in Appendix I. This table includes all
identified accounts with the following categories:
•

Name: The name of the terrorist

•

Affiliation: The name of the terrorist organization affiliated with the account

•

Type of account:
• “RS” refers to a religious scholar.
• “OR” refers to an organization’s official or affiliated accounts.
• “SU” refers to a supporter of a terrorist organization where the real identity
is neither a religious scholar nor an organization.

3.3.2 Counter-Radicalization Accounts
Counter-radicalization accounts refer to all accounts that promote messages
that aim to counter radicalization, extremism, and violent extremist content based on
misguided Islamic beliefs and ideologies. Counter-radicalization accounts' main
purpose is to counter terrorist propaganda and promote tolerance, moderation, and
coexistence. The researcher identified counter-radicalization accounts by manually
recording all Twitter accounts obtained from the Hedayah Center and the counterradicalization glossary (Table 2) using the Twitter search engine. Table 2 is a
compilation of Arabic words and terminologies used to promote peace, tolerance, and
moderation concepts. These words were used as keywords to identify counterradicalization seed accounts. Each keyword was used as a query in Twitter search
engine as explained further in Appendix III. A total of 75 counter-radicalization seed
accounts were identified and recorded (Appendix IV).
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Table 2: Counter-Radicalization Glossary
Arabic Word

English Translation

محاربة التطرف

Counter-Radicalization

السلم

Peace

محاربة االرهاب

Counter Terrorism

محاربة داعش

Counter ISIL

محاربة اإلخوان المسلمين

Counter Muslim Brotherhood

األخوة

Fraternity

محاربة جبهة النصرة

Counter Jubhat Alnusra

الوسطية

Moderation

التسامح

Tolerance

الحوار

Dialogue

االعتدال

Moderation

التعايش

Coexistence

ضد الكراهية

Antihatred

As mentioned earlier, each Arabic word listed in Table 2 was searched using
Twitter search engine. Filtering the Twitter search engine query to include only
“people” refines the search to Twitter accounts only. This type of filter yielded results
on Twitter profiles and accounts only. The researcher then checked each account in
the results and applied verification measures to identify whether or not each account
promotes counter-radicalization content. This decision is based on manually reviewing
the tweet content of each account and checking its relevance to counter-radicalization.
Then the researcher recorded all the accounts that fulfilled the above steps and sorted
each account, based on profile description, into the following categories:
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•

Independent (ID): An account that belongs to a group of people, or a nongovernmental organization or charity foundation.

•

Individual (IN): An account that belongs to a person.

•

Government (GOV): An account initiated by a government body or
government alliance.
Finally, the researcher generated a table that lists the 75 identified seed

accounts usernames, type of account, and the relevant keyword search, as shown in
Appendix IV.
3.4 Data Collection
Data mining and collection of each of the identified Twitter accounts were
performed using a Python crawler process. This process is one of the common web
scraping software that automatically retrieve information from a website (i.e., Twitter).
Python is a programming language commonly used for data science and is one of the
most effective and easy-to-use tools used by data analysts. Python crawler is a web
crawler that structurally browses the Internet to extract web data and information. The
study used software called Anaconda Navigator v3 for programming and coding a
computer script to collect Twitter data.
A total of 136 radicalization seed accounts and 85,328 tweets were collected
on March 29th, 2019. On August 1st, 2019, 75 counter-radicalization seed accounts
with a total of 49,512 tweets were collected. All data were recorded and saved in CSV
format sheets, which consist of the following columns:
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•

Account Information: Username, Followers/Following Information, Tweet
Counts, Creation Date.

•

Tweet Information: Date, Text, Image, Video, URL, and Hashtags.

•

Tweet Engagement: Counts for Likes, Replies, and Retweets.

3.5 Data Analysis
The data have been tested using three types of analyses. First, social network
analysis was conducted to understand community formation and information flow
between the identified seed accounts. The social network analysis was performed using
Gephi, an open-source software for network visualization and analysis that helps
researchers discover networks and data properties (Gephi, 2019). Second, the analysis
of content and context factors on engagement was conducted using parametric and
nonparametric tests. The parametric tests used were multiple linear regression analyses
to measure factors contributing to account engagement, which are tweet type,
messenger type, hashtags, account creation date, and the number of followers.
Mann-Whitney U (nonparametric) tests were used to investigate additional
factors that influence tweet engagements like the narrative analysis. Lastly, the
Pearson correlation test was applied to identify the impact of tweets’ length on
engagement. All tests were executed using software Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS) v25. SPSS is a widely known statistics software used for analyzing
data.
3.5.1 Social Network Analysis
Social network analysis is performed to understand networks, communications,
and information flow between radicalized or counter-radicalization seed accounts
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using Gephi software. Social network analysis is known to be a valuable analysis to
test hypotheses of online behavior and social media platforms (Dignum, 2020). Social
network analysis consists of a series of measures that evaluate a network’s tie strength,
key player, and cohesion (Dignum, 2020). Each account in the social network is called
“node,” and the link between each node is called “edge.” Edge can be present in the
social relation between two nodes, which can be measured by the “transitivity” score.
Transitivity, also known as “clustering,” is a social network property that measures the
number of edges for each node in the network. The higher the score, the stronger the
network tie.
Key players also can be interpreted as important nodes in the network often
measured by “centrality” and “PageRank.” Centrality measures are also a social
network property that identifies the node’s degree of connection and, hence, popularity
or influence. PageRank, on the other hand, is assigning nodes a score based on their
connections or links. This measure uncovers nodes whose influence extends beyond
their direct connections into the wider network (Disney, 2020). Cohesion, however, is
illustrated in network density, where network density is the ratio of the number of
edges in the network over the total number of possible edges between all pairs of nodes.
3.5.2 Parametric and Nonparametric Test
The research data were also analyzed using parametric and nonparametric
analysis to test factors that influence engagement. Multiple linear regression testing is
used to determine the link between several independent variables and a dependent
variable. The models help an investigator examine the relative influences of the
independent predictor on the dependent variable for true conclusions (Salmerón,
García, & García, 2018). The model is advantageous because it can help find relative
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influences on one or additional factors to the criterion value. Nonparametric analysis
Mann-Whitney test was also conducted to test factors, such as special day, retweeted,
and type of tweets (image, pure text, link, or mix) that influence tweet engagement (y),
which is calculated as the average (y1) of a normalized number of retweets (TRetweets),
likes (TLike), and replies (TReply). The equation is as follows:

y1 =

TReply − min(TReply)
TLike − min(TLike )
+
max(TReply ) − min(TReply ) max(TLike ) − min(TLike )
+

TRetweets − min(TRetweets)
max(TRetweets ) − min(TRetweets)
y =

y1
3

Taking the variable image as an example, the procedure is as follows: For each
seed account, tweets were divided into group 1 and group 0 according to whether
tweets contain images. As the data does not meet the assumptions of parametric Ttests, non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests were used to check whether there were
significant differences between the two groups’ engagement.
Sentiment analysis is a process that automates opinions and emotions through
natural language processing, where scores range from 1 to -1. Sentiment analysis was
performed using a natural language processing library called Textblob, which is a
Python library for processing textual data. It provides a simple application program
interface (API) for diving into common natural language processing (NLP) tasks, such
as part-of-speech tagging, noun phrase extraction, and sentiment analysis (Loria, 2018).
Special day publishing is another factor that refers to the date of the message’s
publication. The special days are set to be religious holidays or events in the Islamic
religion for radicalization seed accounts (Table 3). On the other hand, for counter-
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radicalization seed accounts, the special day is set to be the top 10 fatal Islamic terrorist
attacks that occurred from May 2017 to May 2019, as listed in Table 4.

Table 3: Religious Events Date from 2015 to 2018
Even Name
The prophet’s birthday
Ramadan
Eid al-fitr
Eid al-Adha
Ashura

Date
3/01/15
17/6/15
16/7/15
23/9/15
24/10/15

Date
24/12/15
6/6/16
6/7/16
11/9/16
12/10/16

Date
11/12/16
25/5/17
25/7/17
1/9/17
1/10/17

Date
30/11/17
16/5/18
14/7/18
21/8/18
21/9/18

Date
20/11/18

Table 4: Top Islamist Terrorist Attack from May 2017 – May 2019
Date
21/04/2019
24/11/2017
13/07/2018
27/01/2018
22/04/2018
22/05/2017

Location
Sri Lanka
Egypt
Pakistan
Afghanistan
Afghanistan
UK

Fatality
259
305
154
103
69
22

Injured
500+
128
223
235
120
159

09/04/2017
17-18/08/2017
27/01/2019

Egypt
Spain
Philippine

47
15
20

100+
120
102

1/05/2018

Nigeria

86
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Description
Sri Lanka Attack
Sufi Mosque Attack
Balushistan Attack
Kabul Attack
Kabul suicide bombing
Manchester Arena
Bombing
Coptic Church bombing
Barcelona Attack
Jolo Cathedral
Bombing
Mubi attack

3.5.3 Narrative Analysis
The research aims to identify factors that influence tweets and account
engagement. However, to test the narrative type as a factor for influence, the researcher
used the three types of narratives as the main types that have been suggested by
Elsayed et al. (2017) and added two types to suit the study sample. To test the narrative
type factor, the researcher first constructed a codebook that contains the types of
narratives tailored to the study (Appendix V). Then, the researcher selected three
students from UAEU to be coders for the sample. The coders were chosen based on
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their Arabic language and Islamic mastery. The three coders were Arab natives and
Muslims. Later, the researcher held a meeting with the coders and distributed the
codebook to briefly explain the task. The meeting included a group exercise to code
thirty tweets and discussed each type to ensure the clarity of the task.
3.5.3.1 Piloting and Inter-Coder Reliability Test
The researcher selected 60 tweets from six accounts and distributed them to the
coders to manually code the narrative. The coders were asked to code independently
and never discuss the answer of the sample with other coders to ensure the validity and
reliability of the sample results. After obtaining the result, the Krippendorff Alpha
inter-coder reliability test was performed; the score was 0.4. The researcher checked
to clarify the low result; he had to modify the codebook and omit the “other” type,
which was confusing for the coders. Then, he met with the coders, discussed the code,
and clarified all concerns.
A second pilot was distributed to the coders, including 60 new tweets from six
accounts; the result came back with a 0.68 score, which was rejected. The researcher
revised the results and discovered that one coder needed additional explanation to
distinguish between the political and social narratives, which the researcher provided.
A third pilot was distributed to the coders, and the result of the sample was accepted
with a Krippendorff alpha inter-coder reliability test score of 0.911.
3.5.3.2 Sampling
Using random selection software, the researcher drew 2,093 and 2,010 tweets
from radicalization and counter-radicalization seed accounts set, respectively. Then,
the two samples were distributed equally to three coders, who each had approximately
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700 tweets from both types of seed accounts (sample). In order to prevent bias, the
sample file given to the coders contained only the tweet content without other data
such as account name, number of followers, like count, etc. Using Excel, each coder
manually categorized the appropriate type of narrative after reading each tweet from
the sample. The samples were given to the coders via Excel files sent by email. The
first sample, which included 2,093 tweets from counter-radicalization accounts, was
distributed on Feb 27, 2019, and the second sample was sent on Mar 2, 2019. Within
10 days, the coders completed their tasks and sent the results back for analysis.
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Chapter 4: Results and Findings
4.1 Communities, Networks, and Nodes
4.1.1 Radicalization Accounts
Figure 4 shows the result of directed social network analysis with the
modularity of 3.0 resolution. Two communities were identified; nodes are shaped in
size based on their in-degree score. Also, it shows a bridge node, which is an important
node that played a role in connecting the two communities. Interestingly, the two
communities identified are separated by the two denominations of Islam. The blue
communities represent the Sunni sector of terrorist individuals and organizations,
whereas the green community consists of the Shia sector of individuals and
organizations. This separation shows that the two ideologies are distant in their
communications and network.

Figure 4: Directed In-Degree Social Network - Radicalization
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Connecting the two communities is a bridge node that belongs to a Hamid Rezq.
Hamid Rezq is a Yemeni media analyst born in 1979 who works with Almasirah TVa media outlet affiliated with the Houthi Movement in Yemen. He is also known to be
a supporter of the Houthi Movement in Yemen and the Shia movement in his online
activities. Many of Rezq tweets were circulating around Western and Sunni Islam
hatred and promoting the Houthi Movement in Yemen and Shia Islam.

58

Figure 5: Comparison between Indegree (Upper), Outdegree (Lower)
Figure 5 shows a comparison between indegree and outdegree scores. Indegree
shows how many nodes are following a specific node, whereas outdegree shows how
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a node is following other nodes. From this comparison, there are some nodes that do
not change much in size between indegree and outdegree, such as Nodes #17, #6, and
#26. This indicates that these nodes are important and active nodes within their
community. Node #17 belongs to Dr. Hakem Al Mutairi, a political leader and Sharia
Professor affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organization and groups in
Kuwait. Node #6 belongs to Khaled Abu Anas, a known name in Harakat Ahrar ashSham Al Islami Organization but his role and position remain unknown. Node #26,
however, present Dr. Huthaifa Azzam. He is the son of the popular religious scholar,
Abdallah Azzam co-founder of Al Qaeda. Dr. Azzam has a long history in extremists’
ideologies and is known to be linked to several terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda
and Jubhat alnusra.
By applying the in-degree measure of the seed accounts, it shows that religious
scholars gain the highest score (Appendix VI-VII) except for Dr. Hakem Al Mutairi
(node #17). This node shows both a high in-degree and outdegree score. This means
that his account shows that he is not only an important node in the community but also
an active node where he engages highly with a member of his social network. Dr.
AlMutairi claimed to be the General Coordinator of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)
Organization, having a high in-degree and outdegree confirm his role as MB general
coordinator.
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Ansar Allah
Media Center
Ansar Allah
Media Center

Figure 6: Directed PageRank In-Degree Social Network - Radicalization
Figure 6 shows the social network measured by the PageRank score. PageRank
is a test to identify how popular each node is within their community, which shows the
most popular accounts. The top PageRank score represents nodes of religious scholars
and key leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organization and groups in their
country of origin. These nodes identified Yusuf Al qaradawe (MB, Egypt), Salman Al
ouda (MB, Saudi Arabia), and Nabil Al Awadhi (MB, Kuwait). Dr. Huthaifah Azzam
and Dr. Hakem Al Mutairi are political leaders of terrorist organizations Jubhat al
Nusra and Hezb Al Ummah- MB of Kuwait. In the green community, the official
media organization accounts for the Houthi Movement gain the highest score. Qais Al
khazali came second to the highest. Qais Al khazali, the leader of the terrorist
organization called Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq in Iraq (The Leagues of the Righteous) and
known religious scholar in Iraqis’ Shia community.
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4.1.2 Counter-Radicalization Accounts
Figure 7 shows the result of directed social network analysis with the
modularity of 2.0 resolution. Two communities were identified; nodes are shaped in
size based on their in-degree score. Furthermore, it shows that an important node is
known as a bridge node that connects the two communities. Interestingly, the two
communities identified are separated by narrative strategies. The blue communities
represent the counter-narrative strategy that directly counters terrorism, extremism,
and radicalization, whereas the green community is mainly based on the alternative
narrative like promoting peace, coexistence, and tolerance. This separation shows that
counter-narrative and alternative narratives have two distinct communities online.
However, there is one connecting node that links the two communities. This node
belongs to an individual called “Naif Harbi” where connect 15% of the members in
the blue communities, with about 40% of the member of the green communities. Naif
Alharbi is a Saudi citizen individual that initiated a community organization called
“Saudis for Peace” in which he promotes online messages and campaigns to promote
peace, tolerance, and moderation.
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Figure 7: Directed In-Degree Social Network - Counter-Radicalization
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Figure 8: Comparison between Indegree (Upper), Outdegree (Lower)
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Figure 8: Comparison between Indegree (Upper), Outdegree (Lower) (Continued)
Figure 8 shows a comparison between indegree and outdegree scores. Indegree
shows how many nodes are following a specific node, whereas outdegree shows how
a node is following other nodes. From this comparison, there are some nodes that do
not change much in size between indegree and outdegree, such as Nodes #2, #22, and
#26. This can be explained that these nodes are important nodes and active nodes
within their community. Node #2 belongs to the Arabic Twitter of the Global Coalition
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Against Daesh (ISIL). This coalition was formed in 2014 to fight Daesh on all fronts,
and it consists of 84 member countries. Node #22 belongs to the International Institute
for Tolerance in Dubai. Launched in 2017 by order of H.H. Sheikh Mohammed Bin
Rashid, this institute is the first organization to institutionalize the values of
coexistence, love, and human brotherhood. Assakina Campaign (Node #26) is a Saudi
initiative to combat extremism and promote moderation and social peace. These
through nodes are somehow constructed to be both important and active within their
community.
By applying in-degree, it shows that government organizations gain the highest
score (Appendix VIII-IX) except for Abdullah Bin Bayyah, a religious scholar known
for his efforts in promoting moderate Islamic values and tolerance. Abdulla Bin
Bayyah is the President of the UAE Council of Fatwa and Forum for Promoting Peace
in Muslim Societies. This node shows both a high in-degree and outdegree score.
Considering his profession, his account shows that he is not only an important node in
the community but also an active node where he engages highly with members of his
social network.
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Figure 9: Directed PageRank In-Degree Social Network - Counter-Radicalization
Figure 9 shows the social network measured by the PageRank score. Accounts
are scaled based on their PageRank score. These accounts belong to the main
government’s alliance accounts for counter-radicalization, except for Abdullah Bin
Bayyah. Accounts such as Sawab Center, Etidal, Global Coalition, and Forum for
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Promoting Peace and Tolerance are well-established centers or organizations launched
by governments to counter-radicalization’s ideologies.
4.1.3 Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization Networks
Table 5 provides network-level measure comparisons between radicalization
and counter-radicalization networks. Radicalization indicates a density of 0.054 and
an average path length of 3.278, compared to 0.084 density and a 3.079 average path
length for counter-radicalization networks. The lower density and high average path
explain why the rates of exchange and communication are low. The radicalization
network is more central because of a higher average degree and transitivity. Higher
centrality contributes to greater cohesiveness, reach, and strength of ties. Therefore,
based on the results, the idea in H1 that radicalized accounts have a stronger social
network than counter-radicalization accounts, is supported.

Table 5: Network-level Measures Comparison
Measure

Radicalization Counter-Radicalization

Size

131

63

Edges

928

327

Average Degree

7.084

5.19

Density

0.054

0.084

10

7

Average Path Length

3.278

3.079

Transitivity

0.26

0.244

Diameter
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4.2 Content and Context Factors Influence Twitter Engagement
4.2.1 Radicalization Accounts
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variables. Since
the independent variables is not normally distributed, a logarithm transformation of
the data was performed to fulfil the assumptions of multiple linear regression.
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables –Radicalization
N

Minimum Maximum Mean

Std.
Deviation

Replies

Likes

Retweets

Valid N
(listwise)

Sum
Max
Min
Mean
Median
Sum
Max
Min
Mean
Median
Sum
Max
Min
Mean
Median

135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135
135

1
1
0
.001
.0
1
1
0
.001
.0
1
1
0
.004
.0

74341
23519
10
94.985
70.0
498736
126486
33
835.994
569.5
877487
443979
144
1917.304
1114.0

10136.51
1167.55
.11
16.08
5.36
60834.63
7431.87
1.65
99.63
34.43
107376.79
11490.07
7.19
170.16
74.052

15673.64
2930.39
.89
21.66
11.93
93190.93
20094.61
4.76
146.05
75.64
175187.09
45233.91
20.18
278.89
163.9322
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Table 7: Multiple Linear Regression of Engagement Factors - Radicalization
Factors

Type RS
Following
Sentiment
Mean
Tweet Count
Account
Creation
F
dfs
R2
Note.

***

Retweets

Likes

Replies

Beta
.469*
5.790E-5
8.546***

t
2.310
.546
6.226

Beta
.449*
3.930E-5
9.183***

t
2.382
.386
7.006

Beta
.410*
8.938E-5
7.619***

1.641E-6
.001

.511
.175

-2.865E-7
.004

-.093
1.241

-1.148E-6 -.380
.001
.892

10.440***
5,129
.288

12.802***
5,129
.332

t
2.206
.892
5.903

9.659 ***
5,129
.272

p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

Multiple regressions were conducted in order to examine the predictability of
factors including the type of messenger, following, sentiment score, tweet count,
account creation time, and hashtag number on three engagement measures, i.e.,
number of retweets, likes, and replies, respectively. The six factor scores were entered
simultaneously in the multiple regression. Table 7 contains the results of the
simultaneous multiple regression for the three influence measures. All three models
containing six factors were significant.
For retweets, a significant regression equation was found F(5,129)= 10.440,
p<0.000, with an R2 of 0.288. The data predict that retweets count is equal to 1.226 +
0.469 (Type of Messenger) + 5.790E-5 (Following)+ 8.546 (Sentiment) + 1.641E-6
(TweetCount) +0.001 (account creation date). Two predictors are significant, religious
scholar (b=0.469, p<0.05) and sentiment (b=8.546, p<0.001). The results show that if
an account is a religious scholar and uses positive sentiment gets more retweets.
For likes, a significant regression equation was found F(5,129) =12.802,
p<0.000, with an R2 of 0.332. The data predict that replies count is equal to 0.836 +
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0.449 (Type of Messenger) +3.930E-5 (Following)+ 9.183 (Sentiment) - 2.865E-7
(TweetCount) + 0.004 (account creation date), Two predictors are significant, religious
scholar (b=0.449, p<0.05) and sentiment (b=9.183, p<0.001). The results show that if
an account is a religious scholar and uses positive sentiment gets more likes.
For replies, a significant regression equation was found F(5,129) = 9.659,
p<0.000, with an R2 of 0.272. The data predict that replies count is equal to 0.276 +
0.410 (Type of Messenger) + 8.938E-5 (Following)+ 7.619 (Sentiment)– 1.148E-6
(TweetCount) + 0.001 (account creation date). Two predictors are significant, religious
scholar (b=0.410, p<0.05), sentiment (b=7.619, p<0.001). The results show that if an
account is from a religious scholar using positive sentiment, gets more replies.
As stated in the literature, likes, replies, and retweets are all elements that
contribute to engagement. The results of the test indicate that accounts belong to
religious scholars have a high engagement. Therefore, H3 that stated religious scholar
types gain higher tweet engagement than other messenger types, is supported. The
results also indicate that tweets with positive sentiment and hashtags inclusion attract
high engagement; Therefore, H5a and H10a is supported.

Table 8: Mann-Whitney Tests on Tweets Engagement Factors - Radicalization
Factors

P

P_positive

P_negative

Is Special
Day
Image

58.11%

20.27%

37.84%

81.31%

54.21%

27.10%

Link

77.53%

5.62%

71.91%

Pure text

70.43%

40.87%

29.57%

mix

74.75%

32.32%

42.42%
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In Table 8, column P positive showed the percentage of accounts that have
positive significance, and column P negative showed the percentage of accounts that
have negative significance. The results showed that 20.27% of accounts whose tweets
published on a special day get significantly more engagement, while 37.84% of
accounts whose tweets are published on a special day gets significantly less
engagement. On a special day, P-value calculated to be 58.11%, which is not
significant; therefore, H5a – tweets published on special days induces higher
engagement than posts published on regular days – is rejected.
54.21% of accounts whose tweets have images get significantly more
engagement, while 27.10% of accounts whose tweets are retweeted get significantly
less engagement. The test indicates that the image variable is significant, with a Pvalue of 81.31%. Therefore, H8a that stated that images and videos have higher
engagement than pure text is supported.
4.2.2 Counter-Radicalization Account
Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variables. Since
the independent variables is not normally distributed, a logarithm transformation of
the data was performed to fulfil the assumptions of multiple linear regression.
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables– Counter-Radicalization

Replies

Likes

Retweets

Valid N
(listwise)

Sum
Max
Min
Mean
Median
Sum
Max
Min
Mean
Median
Sum
Max
Min
Mean
Median

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75

0
0
0
.00
.0
5
1
0
.01
.0
32
2
0
.0
.05

434811
77804
1
1561.75
34.0
2407451
266556
29
9277.42
318.5
1981153
235130
53
315.0
7304.52

35408.25
9562.96
.03
66.078
2.35
176022.83
47270.87
1.33
345.15
17.02
194236.40
42696.59
1.93
26.69
356.03

78081.91
17915.84
.16
200.75
6.43
397335.32
90998.21
4.89
1156.16
47.72
368478.06
72013.58
7.45
62.021
941.84

Table 10: Multiple Linear Regression of Engagement Factors – CounterRadicalization
Factors

Type GOV
Following
Sentiment
Mean
Tweet Count
Account
Creation
F
dfs
R2
Note.

***

Retweets

Likes

Replies

Beta
-.002
3.766E-6
4.179*

t
-.010
1.648
2.048

Beta
-.250
4.297E-6
3.284

t
-.103
1.826
1.562

Beta
-.069
4.268E-6
3.561

t
-.278
1.798
1.673

-3.401E6***
.006

-4.039

-4.294E6***
.006

-4.950

-3.228E6***
.007

3.702
1.839

5.138***
5,69
.521

1.842

6.590***
5,69
.323

1.805

4.649**
5,68
.255

p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

Multiple regressions were conducted in order to examine the predictability of
factors including the type of messenger, following, sentiment score, tweet count,
account creation time, and hashtag number on three engagement measures, i.e.,
number of retweets, likes, and replies, respectively. The six factor scores were entered
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simultaneously in the multiple regression. Table 10 contains the results of the
simultaneous multiple regression for the three influence measures. All three models
containing six factors were significant.
For retweets, a significant regression equation was found F(5,69)= 5.138,
p<0.000, with an R2 of 0.521. The data predict that retweets count is equal to 1.080 0.002 (Type of Messenger) + 3.766E-6 (Following)+ 4.179 (Sentiment) - 3.401E-6
(TweetCount) + 0.006 (account creation date). Two predictors are significant,
sentiment (b=4.179, p<0.05) and tweet counts (b= -3.401E-6, p<0.001) and. The
results show that if an account uses positive sentiment gets more retweets.
For likes, a significant regression equation was found F(5,69) =6.590, p<0.000,
with an R2 of 323. The data predict that replies count is equal to 0.990 - 0.250 (Type
of Messenger) + 4.297E-6 (Following)+ 3.284 (Sentiment) - 3.228E-6 (TweetCount)
+ .006 (account creation date), Only tweet counts was significant (b= - 4.294E-6,
p<0.001). The results show that if an account is tweeting more often gets slightly less
likes.
For replies, a significant regression equation was found F(5,68) = 4.649,
p<0.01, with an R2 of 0.255. The data predict that replies count is equal to 0.247 0.069 (Type of Messenger) + 4.268E-6 (Following)+ 3.561 (Sentiment) – 3.228E-6
(TweetCount) + 0.007 (account creation date). Only tweet counts were significant (b=
-3.228E-6, p<0.001). The results show that if an account is tweeting more often gets
less replies.
Therefore, only sentiment score present significant result, and therefore H5b is
supported, and hypotheses H2b, H4, and H10 is being rejected. The Mann Whitney
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test indicated no significant results for other factors like massage type and special day.
These results reject the idea in H8b, which stated that tweets with images and videos
generate high engagement. Besides, H5b is rejected because tweets published on a
special day were not significant.
4.3 Content Factors Influencing Twitter Engagement Based on Sample Dataset
4.3.1 Radicalization Accounts
4.3.1.1 Narrative Analysis
Table 11 represents a Mann-Whitney U test on a total of 2093 tweets
engagement based on narrative type. First, the test indicates that political and military
narrative is significant only when it comes to predicting likes where the P-value is
(0.019). This suggests that using political and military narrative will have a positive
effect on tweets engagement, more specifically in like counts. As for religious
narrative, the results show significant results with retweets (P-value= 0.003) and likes
(P value= 0.011). Religious and Ideological narrative, therefore, affects tweets'
engagement positively. However, it shows no significant result in reply counts. Lastly,
social and heroic narrative significantly increase all three elements of engagement,
where the P-value is (0.007) for retweets, (0.013) for likes, and (0.021) for replies.
Therefore, the idea in H6a that using social and heroic narratives will increase tweet
engagement in radicalized accounts is supported.
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Table 11: Mann-Whitney U test on Narrative – Radicalization
Factors

Political

Retweet

U
418508.00

Reply

415147.50

Like

403950.50* -2.34

Note.

***

Religious

Social

Z
-1.15

U
Z
196161.50** -2.98

U
Z
505429.00** -2.69

-1.49

208106.00

-1.70

511966.50*

-2.31

200176.00*

-2.53

508207.00*

-2.49

p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 (appendix X)

4.3.1.2 Tweets length
Pearson correlation tests were performed to examine possible relationships
between tweet length and tweet engagement types (Table 12). The result shows that
retweet is significantly and positively correlated to tweet length, r (2093) = 0.132,
p<0.01. Likes, on the other hand, is slightly significant and positively correlated to
tweet length, r (2093) =0.043, p<0.05. It means that tweet length is a factor of
Engagement, and the larger the tweet is, the higher the Engagement. Therefore, H7a is
supported.
Table 12: Pearson Correlation for radicalization’s Tweet Length and Engagement

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
TReply
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
TLike
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
TRetweets Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Length

Length TReply
1
.031
.155
2093
2093
.031
1
.155
2093
2093
.043*
.330**
.049
.000
2093
2093
.132**
.549**
.000
.000
2093
2093

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

TLike TRetweets
.043*
.132**
.049
.000
2093
2093
.330**
.549**
.000
.000
2093
2093
1
.657**
.000
2093
2093
.657**
1
.000
2093
2093
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4.3.2 Counter-Radicalization Accounts
4.3.2.1 Narrative Analysis
A Mann-Whitney test of 2003 tweets indicated that likes and retweet counts
were significant in Political Narrative with a P-value of (=0.000) for likes and (=0.006)
(Table 13). This result illustrates that using political and military narrative will have a
negative effect on tweet’s Engagement. As for the religious narrative, the result is only
significant for likes with a P-value equal to 0.001. Religious and Ideological narratives,
therefore, affect tweets’ Engagement positively.
Table 13: Mann-Whitney U test on Narrative – Counter-Radicalization
Factors

Political

Retweet

U
336247.50**

Z
-2.75

U
211798.50

Z
-.60

U
444122.00

Reply

348967.50

-1.73

202342.50

-1.86

438971.50** -2.86

Like

299598.50*** -6.09

Note.

***

Religious

Social

187651.50** -3.45

434005.00*

Z
-1.82

-2.24

p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 (appendix XI)

Social and Heroic narrative, however, is significant in likes and replies only
but not significant for retweets. The P-value is (0.025) for likes and (0.004) for replies.
Unlike political narrative, the effect of social and heroic narrative is positive in terms
of likes and replies, which indicates a better interaction between the narrator and the
receiver. Like, reply and retweet are elements of tweet engagement, therefore, an
increase of one element will reflect positively in Engagement. Social narrative has a
significant effect on tweet engagement. Thus, supporting H6b.
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4.3.2.2 Tweet length
Pearson correlation tests were performed to examine possible relationships
between tweet length and tweet engagement types (Table 14). The result shows that
retweet is significantly and positively correlated to tweet length, r (2010) = .077,
p<0.01. It also shows that reply is significant and positively correlated to tweet length,
r (2010) = 0.062, p<0.01. Likes, on the other hand, is slightly significant and positively
correlated to tweet length, r (2093) =0.043, p<0.05. Thus, H7b is supported, which
states that the lengthier the tweet, the higher the engagement.
Table 14: Pearson Correlation for Counter-Radicalization’s Tweet Length and
Engagement
Length
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
TReply
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
TLike
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
TRetweets Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

1

Length

2010
.062**
.006
2010
.045*
.044
2010
.077**
.001
2010

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

TReply
.062**
.006
2010
1
2010
.936**
.000
2010
.942**
.000
2010

TLike
.045*
.044
2010
.936**
.000
2010
1
2010
.914**
.000
2010

TRetweets
.077**
.001
2010
.942**
.000
2010
.914**
.000
2010
1
2010
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4.4 Findings and Hypotheses Results
Table 15 shows the hypotheses, test performed and its results.
Table 15: Findings and Hypotheses Results
Hypothesis
H1: Radicalization accounts have stronger social
networks than Counter-Radicalization accounts.
H2a: In radicalization accounts, more frequent
tweeting results in higher account engagement.
H2b: In counter-radicalization accounts, more
frequent tweeting results in higher account
engagement.
H3: Religious scholars’ radicalization accounts
gain higher engagement than other account types.
H4: Government counter-radicalization accounts
gain higher engagement than other account types.
H5a: In radicalization accounts, tweets published
on special days induces higher engagement than
posts published on regular days.
H5b: In counter-radicalization accounts, tweets
published on special days induces higher
engagement than posts published on regular days.
H6a: Using social and heroic narratives will
increase tweets engagement in radicalized
accounts.
H6b: Using social and heroic narratives will
increase tweet engagement in counter-radicalized
accounts.
H7a: In radicalization accounts, the longer the
tweet, the higher the engagement.
H7b: In counter-radicalization accounts, the longer
the tweet, the higher the engagement.
H8a: In radicalization accounts, images and videos
have higher engagement than pure text.
H8b: In counter-radicalization accounts, images
and videos have higher engagement than pure text.
H9a: In radicalization accounts, positive
sentiments have higher engagement than negative
sentiments.
H9b: In counter-radicalization accounts, positive
sentiments have higher engagement than negative
sentiments.
H10a: In radicalization accounts, tweets with
hashtags have higher Engagement than posts
without hashtags.
H10b: In counter-radicalization accounts, tweets
with hashtags have higher Engagement than posts
without hashtags.

Test Performed

Results

Social Network Analysis

Supported

Multiple Linear
Regression
Multiple Linear
Regression

Supported

Multiple Linear
Regression
Multiple Linear
Regression
Mann-Whitney

Supported

Mann-Whitney

Rejected

Mann-Whitney

Supported

Mann-Whitney

Supported

Pearson Correlation

Supported

Pearson Correlation

Supported

Mann-Whitney

Supported

Mann-Whitney

Rejected

Multiple Linear
Regression

Supported

Multiple Linear
Regression

Supported

Multiple Linear
Regression

Supported

Multiple Linear
Regression

Rejected

Supported

Rejected
Rejected

79

Chapter 5: Conclusion and Discussion
5.1 Conclusion
Social network analyses conclude that the network community is separated
based on religious beliefs in the radicalization network and based on narrative strategy
in the counter-radicalization network. The Sunni and Shia Islam communities are
divided within the radicalization network. Counter and alternative narrative strategy,
on the other side, separate the counter-radicalization accounts. Content and context
factors show that messenger types, narrative, sentiment, Tweet length, Tweet types,
and hashtag usage are factors that predict engagement in radicalization. In counterradicalization, however, narrative type and sentiment are the only predictors of
influence engagements. Understanding the network formation, communities, and
nodes on both radicalization and counter-radicalization accounts all indicate that
counter-radicalization has a higher speed of communication and exchange, but less
cohesiveness and audience reach. Messenger type, sentiment, and narratives were
concluded to play a role in positively influencing engagements.
In conclusion, the radicalization network has a faster and higher reach than
counter-radicalization accounts. Counter-radicalization communities have weaker ties
and less cohesion between their network's nodes. Second, the factors of engagement
differ between the two networks. Radicalization accounts receive the highest
engagements when a religious scholar represents them. Engagement is also increased
when using positive sentiments, hashtags, and social and heroic narratives. On the
other hand, counter-radicalization receives high engagement when an account uses
positive sentiments and social and heroic narratives. Finally, the results concluded that
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a radicalization network has high cohesion, better communication reach, and a faster
information flow than a counter-radicalization network.
In counter-radicalization, an account should focus not only on follower counts
but also on following other accounts to avoid being a "sink node" that does not follow
anyone (following = 0). This element is mostly noticed in government accounts.
Counter-radicalization accounts should focus more on social narratives and avoid
political narratives to gain high engagement; as seen in the radicalization network, the
most effective narratives are social and religious. The length of tweets also contributes
to engagement; therefore, ensuring that tweets are lengthier and clearer could increase
user engagement. In line with this, governments and alliances could work with social
media platforms like Twitter to take down important nodes, such as bridges, to
dismantle the dissemination of radical ideologies and minimize exposure to
radicalization content online.
5.2 Discussion
The research findings identify the essential elements of social networks and the
different factors that influence engagement on Twitter. The analysis of social networks
describes the characteristics of the radicalization and counter-radicalization accounts
on Twitter and the communication and information flow in these networks. The results
show that communities are formed based on their mutual ideologies and shared school
of thoughts. The result shows that radicalization seed accounts are divided based on
the two main branches of Islam: Sunni or Shia (Figure 4). Sunni Islam represents the
majority of Muslims around the world, whereas Shia Islam is considered to be minority
Muslims. The Sunni community represented most of the radicalization network, where
73% of the radicalization network identified to be Sunni accounts. Similarly, the two
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communities formed for counter-radicalization are separated by a narrative-type
strategy (Figure 7). Counter-radicalization networks were separated almost equally.
Counter narrative accounts represent 56% of the network, and alternative narrative
accounts represent the remaining 44%. Although both narratives are used to counter
radical ideologies, the counter-narrative is offensive and challenges radicalization
directly; the alternative narrative represented in the other community focuses on
promoting the real Islamic values of moderation and tolerance. This finding confirms
a study by Mikal et al. (2014), which used SIDE as a theoretical framework and
focused on an online image-sharing community (www.imgur.com). The hypothesis
was that when individuals join online groups, they identify as members of those groups
and modify their behavior to affirm their membership. Hence, their online interactions
confirm their social, rather than their individual identities, resulting in a collective
voice on the website.
The findings also show that the type of messenger could play a role in the social
network. As shown in Figure 5, supporters have the highest interaction within their
social networks. Religious scholars and organizations have low interactions within the
social network compared to supporters. Previous studies have suggested that when
analyzing computer-mediated communication (CMC), traditional power and status
differences do not affect virtual communities because status cues are harder to read in
electronic messages (i.e., tweets). On the other hand, CMC offers highly anonymous
users the freedom to adopt new identities (i.e., the supporter type) and liberate
themselves from the limitations that the constraints of reality might impose (Postmes
et al., 1998).
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Religious scholars, nevertheless, similar to the government type in counterradicalization seed accounts, have the highest PageRank and indegree scores. In an
Islamic community, a religious scholar is perceived to be the highest authority and
source of credibility. Therefore, it is predicted that religious scholars will have the
highest numbers of followers and engagement within the community. This finding
shows that for a virtual social group, identified members of the social group, such as
religious scholars and organization leaders, must be present for a stronger SIDE and
network influence in social media. A lack of identifiable people within a virtual social
group results in a weaker social identity because a group has no appeal for its members.
Therefore, the cover of anonymity may be used for disengagement (Postmes et al.,
1998).
One of the notions of the heuristic-systemic model is that in processing
information, the prevalence of one mode often weakens or biases the other (Johnson,
2018). When public figures, for example, publish a tweet, their influence on followers
tends to cloud their judgment. As a result, heuristic approaches tend to overrun
systemic modes in processing the information. Bias is introduced, which often leads
to most people agreeing with whatever these public figures tweet. For instance, the
radicalization sympathizers or audience expect a religious scholar (RS) to offer a more
credible argument about religious matters than a politician or, in this case, Supporter
(SU). Such bias means that people will use more of their heuristic cues than systemic
when interacting with information from the religious scholar. The result is that they
even agree with particulars that they may, in normal circumstances, disagree with if it
came from a different source. Equally, the audience’s motivation to critically process
information is limited as they have too much trust in public figures; this is because a
lack of motivation tends to hinder the application of systematic cues (Xiao et al., 2018).
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Consequently, most people agree with information posted by public figures on social
sites like Twitter, leading to these individuals getting more likes, retweets, and replies.
Moreover, social network analysis identified many characteristics of networks,
communications, and information flow in both radicalization and counterradicalization Twitter networks, where the radicalization network showed a stronger
cohesion, having a higher average degree and transitivity score. Average degree is a
measure that indicates the average number of accounts directly connected to a specific
account within a network. The higher the number of direct links, the higher the reach
of communication. Transitivity also contributes to cohesiveness that measures the
level of strength tied between network nodes. The radicalization network also has a
higher diameter score, which indicates that the network is less scattered than the
counter-radicalization network. This means that less time is needed for information or
communication to travel and reach the whole network. A dispersed or sparse network
is less desirable when information and communication exchange is important. To
counter the dissemination of radical ideologies in such a network, one can overcome
the network structure identified by this study. Although having a transitive and
centered network works in propaganda dissemination, taking down key players or
important nodes would obstruct the network structure.
In the radicalization network, the results also identify the factors that have a
significant and positive influence on engagement, such as message types. The
heuristic-systemic model of information processing is a dual-process theory stating
that individuals apply systemic and heuristic cues based on their motivation and
capacity. Johnson (2018) also argues that dual theories depend on an individual’s
processing capacity. In this regard, using plain text tweets minimizes a person’s ability
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to process the information, resulting in reduced motivation to apply systemic cues. As
a result, such media is often ignored or skipped on social media. In contrast, using
images and videos provide clear information that appeals to systemic signals and
which are likely to induce more engagement. Since images or videos constitute visual
information, which tends to induce interest due to their appealing nature; therefore,
such information tends to result in a systemic model of processing as the interest
produced increases motivation.
Nonparametric tests also identify factors that negatively influence tweet
engagement, such as mixed-use of multimedia content and whether or not tweets are
posted on special days. The results show that tweets published with more than one
multimedia receive less engagement. Similarly, tweets published on religious holidays
receive less engagement than tweets posted on regular days. Numerous studies
investigated the time of publishing as a factor of engagement. However, the results of
these studies vary; some found that tweeting on weekdays engages more users than on
weekends (Haustein, 2019). Others suggest that tweeting on weekends have a higher
rate of user engagement than workdays (Semiz & Berger, 2017). This study results
show that during religious holidays, radicalization tweets receive less engagement than
tweets published on other days. Therefore, users engage less during religious holidays
because most religious holidays are public holidays.
In counter-radicalization, however, these factors show no significance except
for sentiment score. The results show no significant influence from context factors.
One possible explanation could be that, in situations in which an individual’s systemic
mode is dominant, the content of social media posts should have a more significant
influence on decisions to follow and share material from a given account. When the
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heuristic mode is dominant, contextual factors, such as the identity of the account,
should play a more significant role. For example, when primarily using the heuristic
mode, an individual might be more likely to accept (and thus follow or share)
information coming from a respected institutional or international source (Zhang et al.,
2014).
Another explanation could be related to the homogeneity of the seed accounts
data. Counter-radicalization accounts tend to incorporate the evident factors of
engagement, such as positive sentiment, images, videos, and identity. If the counterradicalization effort used previously suggested factors of tweet engagement, the
variation of significance would be unnoticeable. Another possible explanation could
be that, besides individuals’ online presence, there must be offline interaction. In a
socially acceptable environment, counter-radicalization audiences are engaged in both
online and offline communication. A study was done by Park (2019) examined the
differences between pro-smoker and anti-smoker communities online. The result
showed a positive association between reciprocity and the likelihood of people
engaging in risky health behaviors together (i.e., pro-smoking or radicalization). As
reciprocity implies a higher degree of trust, individuals are more likely to engage in
risky health behaviors when they share a strong tie with someone rather than a weak
one. Pro-smoking users may build stronger ties with other pro-smoking users to
compensate for lack of offline support, and the interactions between them could
promote smoking behavior. This implies that the radicalization network is more likely
to have stronger ties and trust than a counter-radicalization network in which offline
and online ties are permitted.
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The narrative results also confirm previous studies by Elsayed et al. (2017) and
Sulaimi (2017) in which radicalization ideologies tend to make social and justice
arguments rather than political or religious arguments. The goal is to attract a young
audience that is isolated and seeking justice. This result implies that an effective
narrative tactic to engage young audiences is to use social arguments and heroic
storytelling. However, other narratives showed a significant impact on engagements,
as well. Political narratives in radicalization accounts had no significant results but
turned out to be significant in counter-radicalization accounts. This can be interpreted
as the network’s basis in religious ideologies. The audience is less interested in
political ideologies that divert users’ attention from their interests.
Retweets, replies, and likes are engagement metrics. However, they may play
different roles in engagement. Interestingly, the religious narrative in counterradicalization tweets had a positive impact on like counts, whereas, in radicalization,
tweets were significant for both like and retweet counts. Unlike retweets, likes do not
induce broadcasting because the liked tweet does not appear in the user’s main Twitter
content but rather in a separate tab. A further study on the differences in engagement
measures and influence on Twitter is interesting, and the findings will contribute to
understanding the engagement metrics and implication. For instance, analyzing
retweets alone can be applied in assessing endorsement among users. Retweets are
another form of sharing information and thus indicates that a user endorses information
to the point of promoting it. In many ways, they signify an intent to recommend
whatever is shared (Perreault & Mosconi, 2018). Therefore, retweets imply validation
and approval, but they do not provide specific and high-level engagement insights,
such as is the case with replies.
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Studying Replies only can help in deciding feedback rates. Replies provide
specific information regarding content that can be quantified (Haustein, 2019). They
have also been primarily used to solicit user’ perspectives and views regarding the
topic. On the other hand, likes as the only metric can provide engagement insights that
are useful but general. For instance, content liked can be obtained from a user’s profile
(Semiz & Berger, 2017). As such, sometimes, a person can like content as a way of
bookmarking it to read at a later date. Hence, studying likes alone has weaknesses
where it is difficult to determine whether the information was liked for bookmarking
purposes or because a user agreed with it.
5.3 Research Contribution
The outcome of this study contributes to counter-radicalization literature. It
also supplements the few computational-methods studies on social media in the
MENA region and the UAE. Due to the scarcity of data, there are few studies that
focus on online radicalization in the Arabic context. Therefore, this research
contributes to the literature of Arab region and the UAE. Moreover, since the counterradicalization strategies and laws are relatively new there is no literature found in the
MENA region that discuss the performance and the evaluation of such strategies and
programs. This research contributes to such studies specially in the UAE counterradicalization and tolerance strategies and laws.
The SIDE model's theoretical contribution occurred in the religious or narrative
strategy settings. The separation identified in the social network results shows religious
and narrative strategies. This grouping result lines up with the deindividuation
behavior in the SIDE model. An application of the SIDE model was first used in
explaining individual behavior in religious groups and determining how this implies
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that individuals adjust their anti-normative behavior in terms of religious beliefs and
ideology. This is evident from the radicalization results where the network has a higher
cohesion, better communication reach, and faster information flow than a counterradicalization network. The research's practical implications can be applied to current
policies and laws. The UAE agencies involved in counter-radicalization might benefit
from this research's recommendation to invest more in religious scholars' exposure to
social media, where promoting social narratives positively will increase the
engagement of social media users.
5.4 Limitation and Future Studies
This research's main aim is to understand radicalization and counterradicalization's social network and identify factors that influence user engagement.
However, the study has certain limitations. The first concerns the computational
method. Although this method is suitable for such studies, the understanding of
network patterns and communication must include both online and offline data.
Therefore, the exclusion of offline data is one limitation of this study. Moreover, due
to the complexity of the process, not all radicalization and counter-radicalization
Twitter accounts were identified. Some accounts were hard to validate and link, such
as accounts using aliases and symbols.
Additionally, while data was being collected, some accounts were excluded
because they were either deleted, suspended, or set to private. Moreover, the research
only investigated the public context and content; private messages and hidden
communication were not included. Finally, due to the labor-intensive work of content
analysis, the current results involve only the sample data set. Future studies should
overcome these limitations, while other factors, such as special days, should be further
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investigated, along with how engagement is affected by time. Twitter, while
conducting this study, added new features such as fact-checking and quote reply. Such
features would be interesting to analyze to determine their impact on Engagement.
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Appendices
Appendix I
Radicalized Accounts Identification – Seed Accounts
Username

Terrorist Organization Affiliation

mohamadalarefe

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

nabilalawadhy

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

TareqAlsuwaidan

alqaradawy

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.

Type

RS

RS

salman_alodah

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

drtareqaltawary

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

drshafialajmi

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

shafi_ajmii

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

WagdiGhoneim
aliqaradaghi
jaishalislam
ansaruallah
abdul_rezak_m

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.

SU

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS
Jaysh Al Islam in Palestine (The Army of Islam
in Palestine)
The Houthi Movement in Yemen
Religious scholar of Ahrar Al-Sham movementSyria

OR
OR
RS

Drhuthaifaazzam

Jubhat alnusra

SU

mothaqaf2018

Jubhat alnusra

SU

ahraral_sham

Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).

OR

waleedgaj2002

Ex Jihad

SU

29pw8vFyZ0nk6gd

Ansar Alsharia

SU

al3ahdfm
Tawhidbrigades

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
Tawhid Brigades

OR
OR
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Username

Terrorist Organization Affiliation

Type

hussinion

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

abdusalamsalah

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

OR

almortadha_

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

alzwbah_ym_000

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

waassnnn

Abu Alfadhl alabbas Brigade

SU

almaoaod

Alyoum almaood Brigade

OR

abdulwhab_m_

UAE List

RS

hassan_aldiqqi

drhakem

hosam_sa1

azzam_ansari

bbakr70

jamelalsaleh0

mzmjersh

Hizb Al Ummah (The Ommah Party or Nation’s
Party) in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).

SU

SU

SU

SU

SU

SU

SU

dr_eyadqun

Islamic Front

SU

aboabdulmalek1

Islamic Front

SU

ansaransar20

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.

SU

abusaryah1

Islamic front

SU

rkorvd44

Islamic front

SU

s_islamicfront

Islamic Front

OR

alhiwarchannel

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.

OR

Aleslaahnet

The UAE Muslim Brotherhood

OR

Emiratesop

The UAE Muslim Brotherhood

OR
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Username
OmmahPartyKW

Islamicommapart

ershiad

Khmoath

osamagado2

badr58

Al3ahdNewspaper

IkhwanSyriaFikr

MBSyriaCG

FJparty

IkhwanwebAr

Ikhwansd

MuragebIkhwanSd

MBHassanAlBanna

Terrorist Organization Affiliation
Hizb Al Ummah (The Ommah Party or Nation’s
Party) in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula
Hizb Al Ummah (The Ommah Party or Nation’s
Party) in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula
Hizb Al Ummah (The Ommah Party or Nation’s
Party) in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.

Type
OR

OR

SU

SU

SU

SU

OR

OR

OR

OR

OR

OR

OR

SU

ghadashaweesh20

Jaish-e-Mohammed (The Army of Muhammad).

SU

Moh_Alhouthi

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

RS

rockarab1

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

OR

AbdulMalkHouthi

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

OR
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Username

Terrorist Organization Affiliation

Type

Mohammed56040

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

alejri77

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

hamid_rezq

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

Officealbayati

The Badr Organisation in Iraq.

SU

NorthBadr

The Badr Organisation in Iraq.

OR

iraqii1990

Ahlu_alhaq

Qais_alkhazali

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq in Iraq (The Leagues of the
Righteous)
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq in Iraq (The Leagues of the
Righteous)
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq in Iraq (The Leagues of the
Righteous)

SU

OR

RS

Iumsonline

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) OR

AliBadahdah

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

DrAjsaeed

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

Salemsheikhi

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

Rachedghanouchi

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

Mohammadelfarra

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

dedewnet

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

khaled85211

AbuYahyaAlhamwi

Sohaybabomogahe

alnfgh_alwajba

bybers1986

aboalezahrar82

sory1173

Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Jaysh Al Islam in Palestine (The Army of Islam
in Palestine)

SU

SU

SU

SU

SU

SU

SU

103
Username
HA_alshami05

abohmam_buedany

AbuanasDumayr

Ali_Abd_Albake

alghanim999

ShaqerAlhajri

hamed_alali

albalaakh1434

Alnabaatv_ly

TanasuhTV

Ali45Dr

Terrorist Organization Affiliation
Jaysh Al Islam in Palestine (The Army of Islam
in Palestine)
Jaysh Al Islam in Palestine (The Army of Islam
in Palestine)
Jaysh Al Islam in Palestine (The Army of Islam
in Palestine)
Jaysh Al Islam in Palestine (The Army of Islam
in Palestine)
UAE LIST 25/07/2017 KSA,UAE,BAHRAIN,
AND EGYPT
UAE LIST 25/07/2017 KSA,UAE,BAHRAIN,
AND EGYPT
UAE LIST 25/07/2017 KSA,UAE,BAHRAIN,
AND EGYPT
UAE LIST 25/07/2017 KSA,UAE,BAHRAIN,
AND EGYPT
UAE LIST 25/07/2017 KSA,UAE,BAHRAIN,
AND EGYPT
UAE LIST 25/07/2017 KSA,UAE,BAHRAIN,
AND EGYPT
International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS)
& The Houthi Movement in Yemen

Type
SU

SU

SU

SU

SU

RS

RS

OR

OR

OR

RS

abuabdallah113

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

Daeislam

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

Truthcaller

bathn_allah

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).

SU

SU

safarAlhawali

International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) RS

Alsuhmi

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

abuabdoalmalek

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

BASEMALKHAULANl The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU
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Username

Terrorist Organization Affiliation

Type

son_Taiz_Free

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

hmdan3040

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

TqHxPwMC3YtEGF7

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

abuhuseen7

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

Borkan_030

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

hussinalezzi5

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

aleesa71

asseraaalsham

nasser_yaseen

alzabadaniyah

Moneer_Alssial

Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).

SU

SU

SU

SU

SU

AnsarAllahMC

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

OR

AnsarAllahMCB

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

OR

AwsKhfaji

Abu Alfadhl alabbas Brigade

RS

njJObikZvA5mSiY

Abu Alfadhl alabbas Brigade

SU

lewaa313

Abu Alfadhl alabbas Brigade

OR

muqtada_alsader

Alyoum almaood Brigade

SU

HASSAN_SALEM65

sho_sho__iq

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq in Iraq (The Leagues of the
Righteous)
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq in Iraq (The Leagues of the
Righteous)

SU

SU

lewaaltawhead

Al-Tawhid Brigade

OR

altawheed_sy

Al-Tawhid Brigade

SU

i5wan_lovers

ikhwanonlinecom

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.

SU

OR
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Username
Ikhwan_Wiki

montaseregy

ikhwan_Libya

Terrorist Organization Affiliation
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation
and groups.

Type
OR

OR

OR

N_alnasser71

Alkarama organisation

RS

osa_Qaeda

Al Qaeda

SU

ebrahim_reja

Hizb Al Ummah (The Ommah Party or Nation’s
Party) in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula

SU

mayadaasmaa

Aknaf Bayt Al-Maqdis

SU

HussinAIHuthi

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

Aosamah1g

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

nourabu3ali

a7rar7oms

Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic
Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).

SU

SU
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Appendix II
An Example of Identifying Twitter Account using google search method:
Yusuf Abdullah al-Qaradawi is a Terrorist Individual known to support
terrorism and promote jihad. He is a religious scholar formerly from Egypt but lives
in Qatar, and he is known to be associated with Muslim Brotherhood Organization and
supports radical ideologies through his position as the president of the International
Union of Muslim Scholars. By applying the following steps, his account has been
identified (Figure A):
I. By Typing Yusuf Abdullah al-Qaradawi in google.com
II. Google result shows that Yusuf Abdullah al-Qaradawi has a Twitter account and
Facebook account. The Twitter username is alqaradawe.
III. The researcher checked the twitter account indicated and applied the verification
measures and found the following:
i. Username is alqaradawe.
ii. Twitter account has the verification sign.
iii. Profile Description state that “The official account of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi,
The president of the International Union of Muslim Scholars.”
iv. Current location is Qatar.
v. He has 9740 tweets.
vi. He has 2.3 million followers.
vii. His Tweets content are religious.
IV. Since all the measures are relevant to the individual information. The researcher
confirmed that Twitter account @alqaradawe belongs to Yusuf Abdullah al-Qaradawi.
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Figure A: Account Identification Process for Yusuf Abdullah al-Qaradawi
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Figure A: Account Identification Process for Yusuf Abdullah al-Qaradawi
(Continued)

An Example of Identifying twitter account using twitter search method:
Yusuf al-Qaradawi in arabic is written “ ”يوسف القرضاويthe account will be identified
by the following steps: (Figures B-C)
I.

The researcher type “ ”يوسف القرضاويand tap on people category. Results will
show all accounts in twitter used with this name.

II.

The researcher then checks all accounts in the search result based on the
verification measures. This verification method will identify the actual account
and exclude all fake accounts.

III.

Yusuf Abdullah al-Qaradawi account has been identified based on:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

Account Verification.
Number of Followers.
Tweets counts.
Profile description.
Current location.
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Figure B: Twitter search method and accounts result
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Figure C: Differentiate Fake accounts from Actual account
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Example of Identifying terrorist’s organization twitter accounts using twitter search
method:
al-Tawhid Brigade is a terrorist organization based in northern Syria formed in 2012.
These following steps will identify all accounts associated with this
organization:(Figure D)
I.

The researcher types the Arabic name of al-Tawhid Brigade which
is " "لواء التوحيدin Twitter search under the people category and list
all the accounts in the result

II.

By checking each account profile and apply verification measures.
i.

The researcher categories each account to be a supporter
(SU), unless stated in the profile that they are the official
account and twitter followers and following are relevant to
the organization then the account will be categories as
Organization (OR).

III.

Twitter result shows multiple of accounts and we picked two
accounts for this example.

IV.

Twitter account lewaaltawhead is considered to be OR based on:
i.

Number of followers where the followers number is above
1000 where all other accounts are less than 400 followers

ii.

The profile description state that it is the account of
coordination bureau in Allepo.

iii.

The Profile picture is the official logo of al-Tawhid
Brigade.

iv.
V.

Tweet contents are formal and statement of Syrian War.

Twitter account altawheed_sy considered to be a SU based on:
i.

Profile description where it states that “Im one of the
revolutionaries of Deir Ez-Zor.”

ii.

Number of following and followers

iii.

Tweet contents are informal.
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Figure D: Twitter Search Method in Finding Terrorist Organization Accounts or
Supporter
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Figure D: Twitter Search Method in Finding Terrorist Organization Accounts or
Supporter (Continued)
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Appendix III
An example of Identifying Twitter Account using keywords in twitter search method:
 التسامحmeans tolerance. The research was able to identify three accounts that promote
tolerance in the counter-radicalization context. The steps explained in the following
figures:
Search for the word  التسامحin the twitter search engine and confine the search to
people. And then view each account the result accounts from the search engine.
(Figure E)

Figure E: twitter search and accounts result
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I.

Check all account to reject accounts that does not fulfill the research criteria
as counter-radicalization accounts. For example: accounts @12adv2 (Figure
F), @altsamh_fc (Figure G), @altsamoh_team (Figure H). On the other hand,
three accounts have been identified and recorded as counter-radicalization
accounts (Figures I, J and K).

Figure F: twitter page of the username @12adv2
@12adv2 has been rejected for the following reasons:
i.
Profile Description states that this account is for the 30th high school
graduate from Fatima Al Zahraa High School – Year of Tolerance
graduates’ batch.
ii.
The content of the tweets has been manually checked and there is nothing
in the content that suggest counter-radicalization, counter violent
extremism, nor promoting tolerance.
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Figure. G: Twitter page of the username @altsamh_fc
@ altsamh_fc has been rejected for the following reasons:
i.
Profile Description states that this account is the official account of
Altasamoh football club in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
ii.
The content of the tweets has been manually checked and there is nothing in
the content that suggest counter-radicalization, counter violent extremism,
nor promoting tolerance.

Figure. H: Twitter account of the username @altsamoh_team
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@ altsamh_fc has been rejected for the following reasons:
i.
Profile Description states that this account is football team launched on the
basis of love and tolerance.
ii.
The tweets texts language is not in Arabic Language.

Figure I: twitter page of the username @ppeacenews
@ppeacenews has been accepted due to the following reasons:
i.
Username states that the account is news account for promoting peace.
ii.
The profile provided a website that belongs to Forum for Promoting Peace in
Muslim Societies. Using google search engine this forum has been identified
as a forum initiated by the Muslim World League based in Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia.
iii. The tweets texts language Arabic Language.
iv.
The tweets content matches the profile description in promoting peace and
tolerance.
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Figure J: twitter page of the username @alistiqamatv
@alistiqamatv has been accepted due to the following reasons:
i.
Username states that the account is the official account of Alistiqama
Television Channel in Oman that promotes the spirits of tolerance and
virtue
ii.
The profile provided a website that belongs the TV channel described
which provide additional details about the channel.
iii. The account is a verified which means that the description in the profile is
legitimate information.
iv.
The tweets texts language Arabic Language.
v.
The tweets content matches the profile description in promoting tolerance
and virtue.
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Figure K: twitter page of the username @sawtalhikma_ar
@sawtalhikma_ar has been accepted due to the following reasons:
i.
Username states that the account represents a center of promoting
tolerance values that belongs to the Islamic Cooperation Organization.
ii.
The profile provided a website that belongs the center described
which provide additional details about the center affiliation and goals.
iii. The account is a verified which means that the description in the
profile is legitimate information.
iv.
The tweets texts language Arabic Language.
v.
The tweets content matches the profile description in promoting
tolerance
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Appendix IV
Counter-Radicalization Accounts Identification – Seed Accounts
Username

Type

Keyword

Translated

adyanfoundation

Independent

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

Etidal

Government

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

ppeaceims

Government

taadudiya

Independent

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

SCECsyr

Independent

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

iraqicts

Government

 محاربة االرهابCounter Terrorism

CoalitionAR

Government

fekerksa

Government

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

Brothersirq

Independent

 محاربة االرهابCounter-Terrorism

sawabcenter

Government

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

ce_pss

Government

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

IrfaaSawtak

Government

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

CEPArabic

Independent

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

no2daesh

Government

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

daeshajel

Government

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

althugur

Government

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

nbenotman

Individual

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

libyaalkarama

Government

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

khwanmufleseen

Independent

 محاربة االخوانCounter Muslim

 السلمPeace

 محاربة داعشFighting ISIS

 المسلمينBrotherhood
SayyedAliElAmin

Individual

 االخوةFraternity
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Username

Type

Keyword

Translated

0Strict

Individual

JAN_Violations

Independent

SaharaHewar

Government

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

ksa_amn

Government

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

assakina_com

Independent

Raqqa_SL

Individual

fate_ar

Independent

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

SawtAlHikma_AR

Government

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

oicarabic

Government

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

MWLOrg

Government

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

ahmadalawaji

Individual

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

Uae_Ka1

Individual

 التسامحTolerance

best4gcc

Independent

 التسامحTolerance

hewarsouriya

Government

 التسامحTolerance

saudisforpeace

Independent

 التسامحTolerance

iptpnews

Government

 التسامحTolerance

iitolerance

Government

 التسامحTolerance

votolerance

Government

 التسامحTolerance

uaetolerance

Government

 التسامحTolerance

p_w_b_1

Independent

 التسامحTolerance

ar_dialogue

Government

 الحوارDialogue

pkhalidlm

Government

 االعتدالModerate

MSalmamari

Individual

 التعايشCoexistence

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization
 محاربة جبهة النصرةFighting Jubhat Alnusra

 الوسطيةModeration
 محاربة داعشFighting ISIS
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Username

Type

Keyword

Translated

KACND

Government

 الحوارDialogue

KACND_SH

Government

 الحوارDialogue

Salam4ccAR

Independent

 التعايشCoexistence

alrashed1397

Individual

 التعايشCoexistence

SakerAlzakarai

Individual

 التعايشCoexistence

alistiqamatv

Government

 التسامحTolerance

Ppeacenews

Government

 التسامحTolerance

bin_bayyah

Individual

 التسامحTolerance

HumanFraternity

Government

 التسامحTolerance

youthppeace

Government

 التسامحTolerance

hekmah_

Government

 التسامحTolerance

AlmuwattaCenter

Government

 التسامحTolerance

1journalofpeace

Government

 التسامحTolerance

IamNaifHarbi

Individual

 التسامحTolerance

Emirati4Peace

Independent

 السلمPeace

Dr_salamsahem

Individual

 السلمPeace

Aboalmaha

Individual

 اإلعتدالModerate

alwasatyea

Government

 الوسطيةModeration

sufaraalwastia

Government

 الوسطيةModeration

WasatiaOfficial

Government

 الوسطيةModeration

Tarahumkw

Independent

 الوسطيةModeration

QantaraAR

Government

 الحوارDialogue

AlHAMMAD73

Individual

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization
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Username

Type

Keyword

Translated

bieruty

Individual

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

AlmashoorSs

Individual

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

SakerAlzakarai

Individual

 محاربة التطرفCounter-Radicalization

SaudiCrude

Individual

antiterror_24tv

Independent

 محاربة االرهابCounter Terrorism

Alanbar_2014

Independent

 محاربة االرهابCounter Terrorism

SecurityAden

Individual

 محاربة االرهابCounter Terrorism

D_yassir_1

Individual

 محاربة االرهابCounter Terrorism

anteror24_news

Independent

 محاربة االرهابCounter Terrorism

sasa56576

Individual

 محاربة االرهابCounter Terrorism

Drfahad11

Individual

 الوسطيةModeration

IssaAlghaith

Individual

 الوسطيةModeration

WasatiaOfficial

Government

 الوسطيةModeration

adeladham_

Individual

 الكراهيةCounter Hatred

 ضد التطرفCounter-Radicalization
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Appendix V
Codebook for Narrative Analysis
Narrative Type

Description

Code

Political and Military
Narrative

Which includes news, events, operation,
political speech and statements

1

Religious and
Ideological Narrative

Which includes Qur’anic verse, Islamic
principles, religious statements and events, ..
etc.

2

Social and Heroic
Narrative

Which included emotional expression, social
events, invitation to participate.

3

Promotional Narrative

Which includes all promotion tweets such as
subscription to channels, accounts,
websites, … etc

4

Reponsive Narrative

Which includes all tweets that contain the
symbol “@” as known as “mention”.

5

Other

Any tweet that does not fit the five type

6
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Appendix VI

Top 10 in the blue community (Radicalization)
Account

Terrorist Organization Affiliation

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

Type

SU

organisation and groups

International Union of Muslim Scholars

RS

(IUMS)

International Union of Muslim Scholars

RS

(IUMS)

International Union of Muslim Scholars
(IUMS)

RS

126
Account

Terrorist Organization Affiliation

Type

Jubhat Alnusra

SU

Terrorist List- International Union of

RS

Muslim Scholars (IUMS)

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

RS

organisation and groups

Terrorist List

RS

Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami
(Islamic Movement of the Free Men of
the Levant)

SU

127
Account

Terrorist Organization Affiliation

Type

Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami
(Islamic Movement of the Free Men of
the Levant)

Note: based on In-degree score

SU
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Appendix VII
Top 10 in the green community (Radicalization)
Account

Terrorist Organization Affiliation

Type

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

OR

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

OR

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

OR
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Account

Terrorist Organization Affiliation

Type

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

Note: based on In-degree score
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Appendix VIII
Top 10 in the blue community (Counter-Radicalization)
Account

Description

Type

Sawab Center -UAE

GOV

Etidal - KSA

GOV

Global Coalitions

GOV

Issa Al Ghaith

INV
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Account

Description

Type

GOV
Center of Combating Extremist Ideologies

Counter Terrorism Agency - Iraq

GOV

Counter Terrorism Organization - Iraq

IND

The Voice of Wisdom - KSA

GOV

Khaled Al Hammad

INV

132
Account

Description

Type

Assakina Campaign

IND

Note: based on In-degree score
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Appendix IX
Top 10 in the green community (Counter-Radicalization)
Account

Terrorist Organization Affiliation

Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim
Societies

Type

GOV

Abdulla Bin Bayyah

INV

Promoting Peace News - UAE

GOV

King Abdulaziz Center for National

GOV

Dialogue - KSA

Al Muwatta Center - UAE

GOV
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Account

Terrorist Organization Affiliation

Type

Muslim World League

GOV

Peace Journal

GOV

Minister of Tolerance Office

GOV

International Institute for Tolerance

GOV

The Houthi Movement in Yemen

SU

Note: based on In-degree score
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Appendix X
Mann Whitney U SPSS results – Radicalization Accounts

TRetweets

TReply

TLike

Npolitical
0
1
Total
0
1
Total
0
1
Total

Ranks
N
1526
567
2093
1526
567
2093
1526
567
2093

Mean Rank
1037.75
1071.89

Sum of Ranks
1583609.00
607762.00

1035.55
1077.82

1580248.50
611122.50

1028.21
1097.57

1569051.50
622319.50

Test Statisticsa
TRetweets
TReply
TLike
Mann-Whitney U
418508.000
415147.500
403950.500
Wilcoxon W
1583609.000
1580248.500
1569051.500
Z
-1.151
-1.490
-2.344
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
.250
.136
.019
a. Grouping Variable: Npolitical
Ranks
Nreligious
N
Mean Rank
Sum of Ranks
TRetweets
0
1853
1032.86
1913892.50
1
240
1156.16
277478.50
Total
2093
TReply
0
1853
1039.31
1925837.00
1
240
1106.39
265534.00
Total
2093
TLike
0
1853
1035.03
1917907.00
1
240
1139.43
273464.00
Total
2093
Test Statisticsa
TRetweets
TReply
TLike
Mann-Whitney U
196161.500
208106.000
200176.000
Wilcoxon W
1913892.500
1925837.000
1917907.000
Z
-2.980
-1.696
-2.530
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
.003
.090
.011
a. Grouping Variable: Nreligious
Ranks
Nsocial
N
Mean Rank
Sum of Ranks
TRetweets
0
1149
1014.89
1166104.00
1
944
1086.09
1025267.00
Total
2093
TReply
0
1149
1020.58
1172641.50
1
944
1079.16
1018729.50
Total
2093
TLike
0
1149
1017.30
1168882.00
1
944
1083.15
1022489.00
Total
2093

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Nsocial

Test Statisticsa
TRetweets
TReply
505429.000
511966.500
1166104.000
1172641.500
-2.687
-2.313
.007
.021

TLike
508207.000
1168882.000
-2.492
.013
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Appendix XI
Mann Whitney U SPSS results – Counter-Radicalization Accounts

TReply

TLike

TRetweets

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Npolitical

TReply

TLike

TRetweets

Ranks
N
1521
482
2003
1521
482
2003
1521
482
2003

Npolitical
0
1
Total
0
1
Total
0
1
Total

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Nreligious

TReply

TLike

TRetweets

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Nsocial

Sum of Ranks
1541635.50
465370.50

1046.03
863.07

1591004.50
416001.50

1021.93
939.11

1554355.50
452650.50

Test Statisticsa
TReply
348967.500
465370.500
-1.729
.084
Ranks
N
1756
247
2003
1756
247
2003
1756
247
2003

Nreligious
0
1
Total
0
1
Total
0
1
Total

Nsocial
0
1
Total
0
1
Total
0
1
Total

Mean Rank
1013.57
965.50

TLike
299598.500
416001.500
-6.086
.000

TRetweets
336247.500
452650.500
-2.749
.006

Mean Rank
1010.27
943.20

Sum of Ranks
1774035.50
232970.50

985.36
1120.28

1730297.50
276708.50

999.11
1022.52

1754444.50
252561.50

Test Statisticsa
TReply
TLike
202342.500
187651.500
232970.500
1730297.500
-1.856
-3.452
.064
.001
Ranks
N
Mean Rank
1265
976.09
738
1046.42
2003
1265
980.01
738
1039.69
2003
1265
984.08
738
1032.71
2003

Sum of Ranks
1234750.00
772256.00

Test Statisticsa
TReply
TLike
434005.000
438971.500
1234750.000
1239716.500
-2.855
-2.240
.004
.025
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TRetweets
211798.500
1754444.500
-.598
.550

1239716.50
767289.50
1244867.00
762139.00

TRetweets
444122.000
1244867.000
-1.822
.069

